



**Cameron University Undergraduate Research Journal of Criminal
Justice, History, Political Science, & Sociology**





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Political Science, and Sociology**

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Conservatism and Liberalism in Higher Education during Oklahoma's Vietnam Era: Cameron College to Cameron University

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As America became engrossed with the Vietnam War and the counter-culture era, Oklahoma became subject to college campuses finding their identity in regards to conservatism and liberalism. Conservatism refers to societal expectations that were present in the southern United States, which referred to "staying in line" and less inclined to challenge authority. Consequently, conservatism in this aspect is different than what one would view in the Deep South in the 1960s timeframe. Liberalism, or rather social liberalism, refers to the open-mindedness of social etiquette and interactions with authority and challenging the established expectations of society. One such campus that emerged as a unique-case in maintaining its conservative ideology is Cameron College, located in Lawton, Oklahoma, during its transition from a two-year college to a four-year university at the height of the Vietnam War. Officially named the Cameron State School of Agriculture, established in 1908 through state legislation, the school offered "a useful and practical education to the boys and girls of farms, villages, and towns" within the district to a rural community whose livelihood revolved around agriculture. Through this education, it is emphasized that all students at Cameron were "surrounded by all proper moral influences" in a predominantly religious and military – due to Fort Sill – region of Southwest Oklahoma¹. As the founding of Cameron's identity was built on this precedent, it would appear to still be an influential factor half a century later during a time in which society's status quo was beginning to be challenged. Lawton, Oklahoma's close proximity to the Fort Sill military base also allowed for programs like the ROTC to take hold on campus and influence the identity of Cameron as well. These factors remain important in understanding Cameron's unique case of an ideologically conservative school

during Oklahoma's Vietnam Era as the nation itself faced growing counter-culture and anti-war movements. The use of counter-culture within this work is referred as a means of detailing the societal conflicts within America and the state of Oklahoma. As counter-culture is further referenced throughout the work, it should be noted that when the essence of counter-culture is used to aid in explaining the difference and conflicts ongoing with two differing generations in America throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. This is shown when discussing the more conservative and more liberal leaning values in schools across Oklahoma and its society in general, rather than outright stating or upholding that one educational facility or state was strictly conservative or liberal in a political sense. As the discussion of Cameron as an institution is furthered, these aspects will be touched upon.

In the spring of 1958, Cameron was visited by the Governor's Commission on Higher Education with little success in attaining accreditation as a four-year institution, as Cameron had not kept up with its increase in enrollment and properly determining tuition rates. In the following months of the Governor's Commission visit, Senator Fred Harris, known for his involvement in Oklahoma Indian affairs, announced his support for Cameron and his disappointment in the lack of educational funding the college was receiving. Senator Harris argued that "the growth of Lawton and other southwestern Oklahoma cities makes a four-year curriculum a necessity for Cameron."² On April 2nd, 1962, Cameron, now under President Richard Burch, received an official statement from the North Central Commission that upon Cameron's second request for accreditation as a four-year university had been successful.³ However, it wasn't until the fall semester of 1969 that Cameron had actually begun to offer all four years of college course work, largely in part due to the multiple new standards and teaching positions that needed to be filled.⁴

Cameron College's transition into Cameron University in the years of 1968 to 1971 happened during a time in which the United States was challenged with domestic, social conflict and a foreign war in Vietnam. However, while these respective movements are interconnected, correlation does not necessarily mean causation. The counter-culture by this time had steadily progressed and become a social front to launch activism against the American status quo, while sharing some aspects of opposition to American troops' involvement in Vietnam. Among

the various protests against the Vietnam War and the increasing emergence of student led underground newspapers, conflicts of opinion on how to go about protesting or supporting the war found its way onto campus grounds across the United States. Where conservatism and liberalism are concerned in Oklahoma, these two ideologies mattered because college campuses began to evolve and further develop their own identity among peer institutions. Campuses such as Cameron College established that it would uphold the values that were established during its founding as an agricultural school for the Southwest region of Oklahoma, instructing and providing study through the help of healthy bodies.⁵ However, while Cameron College upheld these values, there was no overall unity on the Lawton Campus, notably in the college's student newspaper, the Cameron Collegian. While Cameron had its own, smaller division in student opinion, the school was much more conservative than the more liberal leaning University of Oklahoma (OU).

The Vietnam War reached the height of American intervention in 1968 when the Northern Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong launched an urban offensive against South Vietnam. This offensive occurred during a supposed cease-fire agreement for the Lunar New Year holiday in Vietnamese culture, known as Tét. The Tet Offensive served as a launching pad for American journalists and observers in Vietnam to relay information to the American home front that contradicted information released by the government regarding the progress of the war. The government led the American public to believe the war was going smoothly and that American forces were winning in a prestigious effort. Both the Johnson and Nixon administrations had private doubts but led the public to believe this conflict was very winnable and in fact, necessary.⁶ However, American journalists amassed contradictory evidence proving the war was anything but "progressing smoothly." The Tet Offensive further increased the clashing of ideological beliefs at the forefront of American society, more importantly, in higher education. These ideological beliefs, conservatism and liberalism, came at an impasse not only in society, but also college campuses and administrations. Aspects of the ideological evolution in society revolved around political and administrative leaders, the presence of ROTC involvement on college campuses, and the influence of American media. Oklahoma itself was involved in this ideological evolution as several college campuses increasingly found their own identity regarding conservatism and liberalism.

The Vietnam War was an international event that was deeply involved in shaping public policy and influencing American public opinion, raising the question of the value of domestic support for a foreign war. Public opinion factored heavily in the direction of the Vietnam War and it proved to be an example of shifts in policy and strategy as the public became aware of the progress, or lack thereof, the United States was making. The Vietnam War proved to be far worse consequences as the government tried to convince the public that the war effort was a just cause; this was a large factor in separating increasing public opinion into a conflict of ideals that traversed both generational and social classes. Polling data indicated that working-class citizens' approval of the Vietnam War declined each consecutive year.⁷ While this data does not represent the entirety of the United States (data was gathered in Michigan), it does indicate that the anti-war and counter-culture movements have variables that are interconnected, while remaining two separate movements with differing identities.

The Vietnam War can also be called the "Living Room War" since news could now be flown back from Vietnam reporters and shown on the nightly news the next day allowing the American public to actually see the war, rather than only read about it.⁸ Even Hans J. Morgenthau, a prominent figure in the realm of international politics, disagreed with American involvement in Vietnam and the Johnson administration's continued efforts. Morgenthau stated the importance of the media in war and shaping public opinion was the key to predicting future actions; "[Morgenthau] in May 1962 said it was incumbent to determine with all possible precision the extent of the American interest in South Vietnam..."⁹ The importance of news media during this time is consequential as Morgenthau was rallying media support to conduct an "experiment" of sorts to determine the American mindset involving foreign affairs in the early 1960s.¹⁰ However, the news media ultimately failed to relay national interest and increased a generational gap between those with pro-patriotic, conservatism stances and those in support of anti-war protests with liberal stances in the context of American involvement in Vietnam. This, too, was a slippery slope as prominent Democrats and Republicans, President Johnson and President Nixon, supported the war effort. Generational gaps were not the only divide in American society, political divides were also within the realm of conflict between members of the same party along with social and economic classes.

Protests in Oklahoma against Vietnam involvement were not uncommon throughout higher education during the late 1960s into mid-1970s.¹¹ In fact, multiple universities across the state found themselves on opposite spectrums of conservative and liberal beliefs. Cameron College, as it was transitioning into a four year university during the early 1970s, maintained its conservative beliefs regarding its educational environment and societal expectations on campus. This makes Cameron a unique case in the state of Oklahoma, as dissent on campus was almost non-existent, due in-part to the control the administration exercised at the time. However, another factor to take into account is the influence of ROTC on campus both when it was mandatory and then when it was made optional in 1971. Interestingly, voter data regarding the 1968 presidential election shows that Comanche County was highly competitive between the three candidates: the Democratic Party nominee Hubert Humphrey, the Republican nominee Richard Nixon, and the independent candidate George Wallace. Within Comanche County, Richard Nixon received 39.8% of the votes while Hubert Humphrey totaled 34.8% and George Wallace obtained 25.4%. To put these statistics in perspective, Nixon totaled 9,225 votes, Humphrey received 8,061, and Wallace allotted 5,879; there was a difference of less than 1,000 votes between the two front runners while the independent candidate had more than 50% of the winner's overall vote.¹² The statistics that emerged from the presidential voting data indicate that Comanche County garnered votes across all parties involved suggesting that the general public was far from unified politically.

While protests were not a definitive problem in regards to the anti-war protests, Cameron had incidents of what can be considered "liberal" actions during the era. Incidents include students that were suspended for dress code violations such as refusing to remove a hat and even a case of a few female students violating dormitory visitation rules or failure to report a similar event was seen on campus in the later part of the 1960s.¹³ Cameron was far more conservative than at OU under the direction of John H. Holloman from 1968 to 1970. One perspective from a non-traditional student attending Cameron in 1968 displays her appreciation in Cameron's conservative values and administrative stance during a time of numerous protests nationwide.

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Mrs. Barbara Hurst, a former employee at the Frederick Leader and current resident of Frederick, Oklahoma shared her experience in attending Cameron during its tenure as a state college in a public forum during her 1968 enrollment. Mrs. Hurst identified herself as a “non-traditional” student that had a family, a 16-year-old daughter and 10-year-old son. She said, “I commute 100 miles from Frederick three days a week to school. It is a great effort financially, physically, and mentally for me to attend Cameron State... [but] there are many outstanding, well qualified teachers at Cameron State.” Mrs. Hurst also expressed her gratitude for an un-named Cameron employee that risked his position within the school to defend his own ideals and stand firm on his principles. Perhaps the most enlightening aspect of Mrs. Hurst’s public forum appears when she discusses Cameron’s administrative involvement on campus and insight to the generational gap taking place; “I am also grateful for an institution in which the administration still runs the show instead of demonstrating students and striking teachers. This is inclusive to our journalism students or teachers who might have forgotten that ‘your freedom ends where my nose begins.’ Some people need to be reminded that freedoms of any kind, including academic freedom, require responsibilities and discipline.”¹⁴

Mrs. Hurst’s comments nearly fifty years ago originate from the cultural status quo during an era where the counter-culture movement was still gaining momentum and gives insight into one side of the already established and increasing tensions between conservative and liberalist ideals across the state.

In 1969 and 1970, several events began to further shape the cultural and political identities in the state of Oklahoma and in areas like Lawton, Oklahoma. Cameron, established as a conservative-leaning school, welcomed back one of the most decorated Vietnam War veterans, Richard A. “Ric” Gatlin, a Marlow, Oklahoma native who was wounded in combat. He continued his education at Cameron after receiving numerous awards for his actions: a Bronze Star Medal with Valor, The Republic of Vietnam Galantry Cross with Silver Star, two Purple Hearts, and finally the Army Commendation medal.¹⁵ There are no records of Richard Gatlin receiving animosity on campus from fellow students, as such cases were more common place in other parts of the nation. Amongst the drive for national demonstration for a moratorium to end the war in Vietnam, Governor

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Bartlett took notice of a telegram by Cameron’s own Barbara Driver, an editor on the Cameron sponsored student newspaper, the Cameron Collegian. Driver stated in her telegram to Governor Bartlett that the Cameron student senate “rejected the moratorium and has a goal to ‘unify America and lessen her internal strife.’ She also states, “We hate war; we hate dying; we love America and will keep Old Glory flying.” This action prompted Governor Bartlett to issue his opinion on the matter of the Moratorium Day, specifically that the date set is not a viable time to have an objective discussion about the matter and that the state should rally in support of President Nixon.¹⁶ In fact, a prominent school that experienced much of the same ideals like Cameron was the University of Central Oklahoma.¹⁷

However, OU, under John H. Hollomon, took a more liberal-leaning stance on campus activities. Students on OU’s campus very much understood the unsteady political and cultural climate as student organizations invited controversial individuals such as Mark Rudd from the Columbia University’s Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) to speak at a campus function. Following this event, in the fall of 1969, Hollomon allowed OU students to take part in the “National Moratorium” to protest against the Vietnam War.¹⁸ Hollomon’s actions garnered the public’s attention and that of Governor Bartlett as well. Hollomon received numerous responses from older, more conservative leaning generations of OU alumni and taxpayers who rejected the idea of student activism and controversial figures on campus.¹⁹ In fact, only nine campuses in Oklahoma participated in the Vietnam Moratorium, the most prominent being OU and Oklahoma State University.²⁰ It would not be until the Ohio Kent State Incident on May 4th, 1970, that OU would have its own major campus conflict and struggle with its more liberal identity.

However, in regards to Cameron College, as arguably the state’s most conservative school, the Cameron Collegian proved that while the administration and student body leaders were “by the book” figures, some students on campus wholly disagreed with their stance. In 1969, Franklin Butler authored an opinion piece in the Cameron Collegian titled “Silence Is Not Security.” Butler stood firm in his support of the Peace Moratorium even though Cameron’s student senate voted to not recognize the moratorium on campus in a twenty four to seven vote. Butler states, “If Cameron is to become a center of learning, something must

happen. The students must wake up – they must voice their opinions on campus at Student Senate meetings.” Butler also wrote that since the student senate of Cameron had released an official statement, the surrounding region now viewed all Cameron students as having the same viewpoint; “you [Cameron students] are now considered by many as supporters of the present U.S. policy.”²¹

The events at Kent State influenced the nation as members of the National Guard opened fire killing four students and wounding nine in an anti-war protest. In an interview, Mary Vincent, spouse to a Kent State professor, states how she opened her house to the public to promote a dialogue for the community to ease tensions after the incident on May 4th. When asked the question, “What so shocked them [the students]?” Vincent responded by saying, “The hostility. Parents who said, ‘If you were mixed up in this, don’t come home again.’ The whole thing. They couldn’t understand why. KSU had been largely – for undergraduates – an apolitical campus.”²² This incident would agitate and fuel anti-war protesters in Oklahoma, especially those attending OU as on May 5th, the following day, anti-war and anti-ROTC protesters gathered and conflict ensued as police confiscated a Viet Cong flag. Three arrests were made in total and Holloman came under public criticize for the event. In return, Holloman resigned from his position in July of 1970 and criticized Governor Bartlett for attempting to run the university and that “outside influence in university affairs could destroy the institution.”²³

The following year, opinion pieces in the Cameron Collegian pitted Ed Waible, future editor-in-chief of the Collegian, and Rob Hirsch against one another regarding the Kent State shootings. Waible states that “revolution is being advocated against a government well equipped with many effective, peaceful, and lawful methods for change and betterment.” Waible is against these “revolutionary acts” of protest as he believes that these continuing events would bring an end to the government and that when a nation has to result to “counter-revolution,” it will end in tragedy. However, Waible insinuates that those in communistic countries suffer oppression that does “not compare to the ACCIDENTAL though tragic killing of four students” during the Kent State incident.²⁴ Rob Hirsch rebuts this position, writing, “How can anyone justify the Kent State deaths by whining about a few broken windows or by whimpering about a few stones that were thrown?” Hirsch adds that “If the Kent State victims had not been in love with their country, they

would not have been out demonstrating their concern.”²⁵ These two opinion pieces were published in the same issue yet find themselves on two different ends of an argument. This disagreement among two Cameron students suggests that political conflict at Cameron College was primarily facilitated through the editorials in the Cameron Collegian rather than upfront in a spectacular fashion on campus in front of the masses.

Two other interesting published works in the Cameron Collegian were authored by Kade Arlen McClure and Richard Maxberry. McClure, in 1970, published a piece that reflected his views on being the editor of the editorial page. McClure stated that during his time as editor, he had come into contact with the “politicians” on campus and stressed the importance of having an outlet that allows for opinions to be heard and viewed. In McClure’s perspective, “Cameron will never be a college until there is meaningful, organized, public, political, and social debate on campus. Where there are thinkers and true scholars there must be politics and debate – this is the very basis of education.” As McClure stated in his piece, “Evidence seems to indicate the Cameron Administration does not want political discussion. They neither encourage nor aid it. If anything, the politics of America, the world, and Cameron have been completely ignored.”²⁶ In 1971, comedian George Stevens was invited to perform during homecoming week. During his performance, Maxberry recalls that the majority of the student crowd began to heckle Stevens to the point of stopping the performance. In his opinion piece, Maxberry calls out those students who incited the rude outburst saying, “Their conduct is inexcusable... It is a tragedy of sorts that a considerable portion of the student body cannot or will not meet the standards of their increasingly progressive society.”²⁷

It would seem as though Cameron College’s transition into Cameron University throughout this volatile time period was relatively tame compared to the events like those that occurred on the University of Oklahoma and Kent State University. Those events in particular were extreme cases within the anti-war movement and projected a stronger case of liberal identity, in the sense of protesting the government and challenging the status quo. Cameron, however, maintained its structural conservative ideals that were instituted in 1908 throughout the next half century into the Vietnam War, as there were largely only cases of political

and social debate through the Cameron Collegian. The only instance that was considerably normal for most colleges to do by 1971 and into 1972 was adopting a selective ROTC program in place of the mandatory precedent.²⁸ As the state of Oklahoma became a political and cultural hotbed in terms of conservative nature versus liberal thought, Cameron maintained its structural, conservative identity and avoided local and regional conflict by doing so. However, that decision resulted in a passive-aggressive rift between students on campus that was showcased through the Cameron Collegian.

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The Correlation between the Rise of the Ku Klux Klan and Vigilante Culture in Oklahoma, 1907-1925

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Following the end of Reconstruction, a group formed in the United States in 1865 from the ashes of the Confederacy known as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The KKK wore white hoods and equated themselves to be a group of vigilantes whose job was to protect and retain conservative ideals that were slowly fading away in the wake of a Progressive America who was adopting radical changes to dating, racial relationships, and social values. The KKK faded away after 1877 when President Rutherford B. Hayes removed the last of federal troops from the South.²⁹ However, the KKK ultimately made a resurgence in 1915 known as the Second Klan which highly appealed to White Protestants as their main targets were Catholics, Jews, and African Americans. During the time of the Second KKK, Oklahoma, a young state admitted to the union in 1907, was trying to deal with an extremely diverse population combined with a vigilante culture that plagued the state at the time. Although the KKK had not made a concerted effort to recruit in Oklahoma until 1920, by 1921 there were more KKK members in Oklahoma than had been in the whole country just six months earlier.³⁰ It was this culture of vigilante justice and racial tension within the state that laid the foundation for the KKK to flourish in Oklahoma. By 1925, the Ku Klux Klan had become intertwined in Oklahoma’s vigilante culture. As vigilante justice grew into a tradition in Oklahoma, the KKK grew alongside it and by the 1920s, the two intermingled with the KKK being a prime example of vigilante culture in Oklahoma.

Long before the KKK saw a viable membership population in Oklahoma, the state was filled with citizens who often took justice into their own hands. Lawlessness ran rampant throughout Oklahoma and the Indian Territory long before statehood. The forced movement of dozens of tribes, often featuring death and despair along the way, destabilized the tribal governments that had previously kept crime within the area in check.³¹ This instability and lawlessness alone would not have given way to such a prevalent culture of vigilante justice if not for the

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fact that most of the people settling in the area were weary and mistrustful of the federal government and were migrating from states that also had a somewhat prominent vigilante culture, such as Texas and Louisiana.³² Most of these new settlers were poor, white tenant farmers and squatters who gave little regard to the Native American tribes in the area as they claimed illegal land. Both the Native Americans and these poor white settlers had a general distrust of the government and in turn, lacked trust in governmental forms of justice, creating the perfect breeding ground for a vigilante tradition to form.³³ Once citizens felt like they could not trust the government or public officials to keep them safe, the matter was taken into their own hands through the use of mob mentality when carrying out lynchings and other forms of vigilante justice.

Furthermore, when analyzing vigilante culture in Oklahoma and how this relates to the rise of the Oklahoma KKK, it is important to understand the people against whom this vigilante justice was committed. Compared to other southern states, like Texas, which also had a prominent vigilante tradition particularly with lynchings, it was not just African Americans who were the main victims.³⁴ Although many of lynch mobs were racially motivated, namely getting justice against an African American male for some slight on a white woman, there were many instances where others became targets of these mobs.³⁵ Criminals, no matter the race, who were accused of murder or assault and were then acquitted at trial, as happened in Ada, Oklahoma in 1909, were often targets of these vigilante groups. During World War I, when ultra-patriotism was sweeping the country, by 1917 there were multiple groups of people who became targets of these mobs intent on committing vigilante forms of justice.³⁶ The most popular targets during this period of ultra-patriotism were young men who avoided the draft and Socialist groups who opposed the federal government and the war itself.³⁷ To become a target for vigilante justice in Oklahoma, one simply had to go drastically against what the majority of Oklahoma citizens considered socially correct and commonplace.

In Oklahoma vigilante traditions, the most common targets of vigilante justice tended to be African American men, particularly those who were accused of committing a crime, especially assault or murder, against a white person. One example of this includes the lynching of Laura and Lawrence (L.D.) Nelson which occurred in 1911. Laura Nelson was a 33-year-old African American woman

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who, alongside her 14-year-old son L.D., was hanged off the side of a bridge near Okemah, Oklahoma on May 25, 1911.³⁸ L.D. was accused of killing Okemah deputy sheriff George Loney on May 2 when he came to serve the family a search warrant in regards to a missing farm animal and Laura Nelson was charged as an accessory since she grabbed the gun. The Nelsons were both being held at the local courthouse awaiting trial when a vigilante mob came in the middle of the night on May 24 and kidnapped them from their cells. The mob also took Laura's baby, believed to be 2-year-old Claire, as she was in the jail with her mother and allegations of members of the mob raping Laura circulated in local newspapers and gossip.³⁹ Despite the allegations, the most horrific part of this incident is the public spectacle it became and the pictures/postcards that circulated of Laura and L.D.'s hanging bodies.⁴⁰ This lynching in particular helps break the myth that only African American men who raped white women were the targets of these vigilante mobs and helps showcase the diversity of the targets of Oklahoma vigilante justice.

Another racially motivated and important incident in understanding Oklahoma vigilante tradition is that which occurred between Dick Rowland and Sarah Page in 1921 which would have monumental consequences for Tulsa, Oklahoma. On the morning of May 30, 1921, 19-year-old African American Dick Rowland entered an elevator operated by a young white teenager named Sarah Page. Several minutes later, Page is said to have screamed while Rowland ran out of the open elevator doors.⁴¹ The next day Rowland was arrested having been accused of assaulting Page, although little evidence was provided to back the claim. Following inciting articles published in the local newspapers, on May 31st a large mob of white Tulsans surrounded the courthouse where Rowland was being held and demanded he be released into their custody.⁴² In response to the white mob, a group of African American men came from Greenwood to offer their assistance to the sheriff in keeping Rowland safe. The sheriff ultimately turned them away, but their presence alone was enough to escalate racial tensions between the two armed mobs. The white mob was never able to get a hold of Rowland and instead took their anger out on Greenwood, a prominent African American neighborhood in Tulsa. This resulted in one of the worst race riots in the United States with the entirety of Greenwood being destroyed or burned to the ground. This incident, although racially motivated, reveals another aspect of these vigilante mobs: their aggression and willingness to take this aggression out on innocent victims through any means necessary.

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As previously mentioned, prior to World War I, racial tensions were not the only reasons for someone to become a target of a vigilante mob. The greatest example of this is an incident that occurred in Ada, Oklahoma when the court system failed its citizens so they took matters into their own hands. On April 19, 1909, four men were discovered hanging from the rafters of a livery barn after the court failed to convict them on charges of murder because of lack of evidence despite there being a witness who saw the accused men commit the murder.⁴³ Early that morning, a mob of vigilantes, more than 150 in number, dragged the men, Outlaw Jim Miller, Jesse West, Joe Allen and D.B. Burrell, from the local jail to enact their own justice.⁴⁴ The targets of the mob were four white men who were accused of murdering a local rancher and former lawman, A.A. Bobbitt, and whom the court system had failed to find guilty of said crime. The mob took the men from the local jail early in the morning and bound their hands behind their back before hanging them from the rafters of the barn. This incident helps showcase the mentality of Oklahoma's vigilante tradition with race and gender taken out of the equation as both the suspects and the victim were white men. Following 1907, many lynchings in Oklahoma were racially charged, with most of the victims being exclusively black, barring a few exceptions like the incident in Ada.⁴⁵ Furthermore, it shows just how far these vigilante mobs were willing to go to extract justice on their own terms. When this mob of 100+ men came to take the suspects from the jail, according to local newspapers, they were met with resistance by the local police force. In response to that resistance, the mob beat Deputy Sheriff Bud Nestor over the head with the butt end of a revolver.⁴⁶ They even left some members of the mob to stand guard at the jail so that local officers would not be able to prevent the mob from completing their lynching. Although the vigilante tradition did not have a set system of rules, they acted almost as a civilian police force, looking after and protecting their neighbors when the government could not.

Another important incident involves the mentality that took hold of Oklahoma's vigilante culture during World War I and how socialists and draft jumpers soon became the next target for vigilante mobs. In *Death in a Promised Land*, Scott Ellsworth discusses other events crucial to the foundation of vigilante tradition in Oklahoma. One of the incidents mentioned occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma on November 7, 1917 when a vigilante mob tarred and feathered members of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW).⁴⁷ The incident was coined as the Tulsa

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outrage of 1917 by local newspapers, as seventeen men were beaten and treated as animals and the event itself was seen as "a real American party."⁴⁸ The IWW was a worker's union, commonly referred to as the "Wobblies," and was opposed to the ongoing war effort and capitalism itself, something seen as un-patriotic by many Oklahomans.⁴⁹ Seventeen 'members' of the IWW were rounded up in squad cars and delivered to a mob of men dressed in black robes who would later be identified as the Knights of Liberty, an offshoot of the Ku Klux Klan, were stripped of their clothes, and tied to trees. Each member of the IWW was then whipped repeatedly until they were covered in blood and finally covered in boiling tar and feathers.⁵⁰ Despite the harsh punishment sought out by the mob, the men were only charged and convicted of not owning a war bond and were fined by the court a hundred dollars each. However, since they were a part of an anti-war union, and a somewhat socialist one at that, when the country was feeling very patriotic in the midst of World War I, the members of the IWW may as well have committed a mortal sin against the country. This incident helps showcase another aspect of the vigilante tradition of Oklahoma in the fact that, despite the men being found guilty and being brought to justice by the court system, they were still sought out as targets of vigilante justice. Even when the court system did not fail its citizens, if vigilantes felt the punishment was not harsh enough, they once again acted as a civilian judge, jury, and executioner.

In analyzing vigilante culture and the incidents just mentioned, it is important to look at the people who were vigilantes. These were not just citizens looking for justice because they did not trust the government; many of these vigilantes were people in positions of authority throughout Oklahoma. For example, in the Tulsa outrage of 1917, it was revealed that two of the organizers of the mob that tarred and feathered members of the IWW was Wyatt Tate Brady, one of Tulsa's founders, and Ed Lucas, Tulsa's Chief of Police.⁵¹ Furthermore, in the Nelson lynchings, some of the men involved were local politicians, including Charley Guthrie, the father of singer Woody Guthrie.⁵² Additionally, in the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, over 1,000 white people were involved in the looting and murdering that occurred in Greenwood with many allegations claiming that local policemen had joined the mob.⁵³ However, despite most of the men mentioned being members of the KKK, not every vigilante was a member of the Klan and not every vigilante was in a position of authority. Despite being heavily intermingled,

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many people were just vigilantes seeking justice for their neighbors not because of some KKK edict. It is important to remember that the KKK appealed to American citizens and especially the citizens of Oklahoma, so even if citizens were not members of these vigilante mobs, there was a large likelihood that they were still members of the KKK too.

For the country as a whole, one of the biggest appeals of the Ku Klux Klan was the fact that it gave them somebody to blame for the misfortune in their life and based many of its rituals on those used in various Christian faiths. Similar to how Hitler blamed the Jews for all of the economic problems Germany faced during World War II, the Ku Klux Klan blamed African Americans, Catholics, and Jews for the ‘problems’ plaguing America.⁵⁴ In contrast to the first Klan, which focused heavily in white supremacy, the second Klan’s official rhetoric focused heavily on the threat of the Catholic Church and Judaism to the government and the nation.⁵⁵ This anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism did not start with the KKK but was instead embedded in the culture of America, similar to racism, all the way back to early American settlers. The second Klan argued that the Catholic Church was a symbol of intolerance, backwardness, and intolerance whereas Protestantism was obviously the faith of enlightenment and of the Klan.⁵⁶ This type of rhetoric appealed to the citizens of Oklahoma as more than half of the state were practicing Protestants and they faced an influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and immigrants of Catholic and Jewish faith.

Furthermore, similar to the vigilante mobs, many people involved in the Ku Klux Klan in Oklahoma were also in positions of authority, ranging from the police force to the mayor and other political figures. One prominent example of this, mentioned previously, was the Tulsa Outrage of 1917 where one of Tulsa’s founders and Tulsa’s chief of police were heavily involved in the tar and feathering of members of IWW and were members of the Knights of Liberty.⁵⁷ The Knights of Liberty was a short-lived faction of the Ku Klux Klan that wore black hooded robes rather than the well-known white hoods of the KKK. However, Brady and Lucas are just a small example of the power and control the KKK had in Oklahoma, especially with regard to Oklahoma politics. By 1924, even though membership was declining, the KKK still retained control of most of the county offices in Oklahoma, had sent a strong Klansmen representative to the state legislature, and, by combining Klan

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votes, had elected W.B. Pine to the United States Senate.⁵⁸ This was not just one or two stray politicians who were members of the Klan; this was a concerted number of powerful people in Oklahoma pulling the strings to ensure the Klan’s political power. Furthermore, this was not a big secret as the Tulsa Tribune wrote, “While it is likely that both senate and house contain a majority of members who are or have been Klansmen, more of them are Trapp Klansmen than Jewett Klansmen.”⁵⁹ If it was so lightly written about in the local newspaper, then it was more than likely common knowledge that the Klan was pulling the strings of so many political leaders. Obviously, for something like this to happen, a majority of Oklahoma citizens had to perceive the Klan in a positive light.

The KKK’s positive image in Oklahoma began early. Simply flipping through the local paper, one could find notices on the front page informing the public about the “KKK initiation and Ceremony scheduled tonight” and the high turnout that is expected for the event.⁶⁰ Rather than a hate group as the KKK is now categorized, many perceived the Klan as a “white knight” society, who wished to keep traditional values alive in America, who endorsed nativism and patriotism.⁶¹ Since this type of thinking especially appealed to small-town Protestant America, which was and still is what predominantly makes up Oklahoma, the Klan was seen as a saving grace by a state that was struggling to keep up with the rest of the country.⁶² Furthermore, although the Klan was heavily involved in vigilante justice, they were also instrumental in community service and helping the people of their community. In 1921 in Ada, Oklahoma, the Klan aided a destitute woman who had lost her husband. They would carry signs like “Beware bootleggers, hijackers and gamblers” while at the same time carrying signs like “Decent people have no fear.”⁶³ They helped the community while keeping them safe when they felt that the police could not. In small towns, many citizens felt that it was impossible to gather evidence on lawbreakers because they more than likely knew every one of the police officers in the town.⁶⁴ Despite the violence that the Ku Klux Klan used to spread their message, Oklahoma citizens did not particularly care as long as they helped their community and kept people safe.

Ultimately, despite how the citizens of Oklahoma may have perceived the Ku Klux Klan and how people in the government may have supported them, there was an effort by Governor Jack C. Walton in 1923 to stifle their control and power in

the state. Because of the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, when Walton took office in 1923, the KKK had increased their power in the state drastically, something that Walton was hoping to crack down on. In 1923, to help combat the KKK, Walton declared martial law in the counties of Okmulgee and Tulsa with the declaration that “mob violence is going to end in Oklahoma.”⁶⁵ Although Walton’s hope was to combat the nightly floggings the Klan enacted, he only managed to alienate Oklahomans who were infuriated at having federal troops deployed in Tulsa and other cities. This incident and other instances of martial law would be Walton’s downfall as he was impeached in November of 1923. However, he refused to go down without a fight. Hoping to avoid impeachment charges, Walton called the legislature into committee with the proposition of a bill to unmask the KKK. Walton’s bill proposed “prohibiting of the wearing of any mask or hood” and “prohibiting trespass upon the premises of another while hooded or in disguise.”⁶⁶ Although he was impeached before the bill passed, it ultimately became law and officially unmasked the KKK in Oklahoma. Although his efforts were only a small factor in the downfall of the second Klan in Oklahoma, Governor Walton’s efforts mark the beginning of the end for the second Klan and for intense vigilante culture as a whole in Oklahoma.

In conclusion, it was Oklahoma’s vigilante culture that allowed the Ku Klux Klan to flourish in the early years of statehood and it was the KKK that altered Oklahoma’s vigilante culture and Oklahoma’s society as a whole. Long before the KKK, the people of Oklahoma had a history of taking justice into their own hands through vigilante mobs since there was little trust in the government to protect them. Since vigilantism was so prominent for the KKK, this allowed them to plant their roots in a key aspect of Oklahoma culture. As the KKK grew in Oklahoma, they altered components of Oklahoma vigilantism, making it less about seeking justice and more about punishing those who went against the status quo. Through their appeal to the common man of Oklahoma, the Klan was able to heavily infiltrate Oklahoma politics and further alter Oklahoma culture and society. Even when somebody tried to combat the Klan, like Governor Walton did, the size and influence of the Klan was powerful enough to have opponents quickly and harshly stifled. In the end, if not for Oklahoma’s entrenched history of vigilantism, the Klan would not have been able to control and alter the state as strongly as they did.

ENDNOTES

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³⁰Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism*, 49.

³¹Ibid.

³²David L. Chapman, “Lynching in Texas,” (Texas Tech, 1973), 11..

³³Steven Messner, “Distrust of Government, the Vigilante Tradition, and Support for Capital Punishment,” *Law & Society Review* 40, no. 3 (September 2006): 562, accessed March 20, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3840513>.

³⁴David L. Chapman, “Lynching in Texas,” (Texas Tech, 1973), 40.

³⁵Jim Etter, “Ada Historians’ play Depicts Vigilante Past,” *The Oklahoman* (Oklahoma City), November 12, 2007, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://newsok.com/article/3167219>.

³⁶Alan Cywar, “John Dewey in World War I: Patriotism and International Progressivism,” *American Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (Autumn 1969): 579, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.cameron.edu/stable/2711935>.

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³⁸Baker Artist, “Lynching of Laura and L.D. Nelson – Original Lynching Postcard,” Baker Artist, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://bakerartist.org/file/lynching-laura-and-ld-nelson-original-lynching-postcard>.

³⁹Rob Collins, “Picture of Horror,” *Oklahoma Gazette* (Oklahoma City), May 24, 2011, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://okgazette.com/2011/05/24/picture-of-horror/>.

⁴⁰Stacey Tisdale, “Black History Month: 20th Century Lynchings Still Costing Blacks Millions,” Black Enterprise, February 2, 2015, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://www.blackenterprise.com/black-history-month-20th-century-lynchings-still-costing-blacks-millions/>.

⁴¹Ellsworth, *Death in a Promised Land*, 46.

⁴²Ibid., 49.

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⁴⁴The Daily Ardmoreite, "Four Men Pay the Price of Bobbitt's Death," *The Daily Ardmoreite* (Ardmore, OK), April 19, 1909, accessed March 25, 2018, <http://www.oklahomahistory.net/adalynch.html>.

⁴⁵Mary E Estes, "An historical survey of lynchings in Oklahoma and Texas," (University of Oklahoma, 1942), 49.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Nigel Sellars, *Oil, Wheat & Wobblies: The Industrial Workers of the World in Oklahoma, 1905-1930* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 3.

⁴⁸Ibid., 3.

⁴⁹Lee Roy Chapman, "The Nightmare of Dreamland," This Land Press, April 18, 2012, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://thislandpress.com/2012/04/18/tate-brady-battle-greenwood/>.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ibid.,

⁵²Seth Archer, "Reading the Riot Acts," *Southwest Review* 91, no. 4 (2006): 502, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://jstor.org/stable/43472750>.

⁵³James Hirsch, *Riot and Remembrance: The Tulsa Race War and Its Legacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), 102.

⁵⁴Kelly J. Baker, *Gospel According to the Klan*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 38.

⁵⁵Ibid., 42.

⁵⁶Ibid., 47.

⁵⁷Davis D. Joyce, *Oklahoma I had Never Seen Before*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 129.

⁵⁸Charles C. Alexander, *The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965), 226.

⁵⁹Political Article, *Tulsa Tribune*, November 9, 1924.

⁶⁰Public Announcement, *The Lawton Constitution*, May 18, 1923.

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⁶¹Shawn Lay, *The Invisible Empire in the West*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 22.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Alexander, *The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest*, 47-48.

⁶⁴Ibid., 49.

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Reducing Delinquency Through Proper Education Budget Allocations

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The purpose of this paper is to raise awareness of Oklahoma's budgetary shortfall and failure to allocate enough resources for education. I hypothesize that thoughtful and proper funding can reduce delinquency by fostering a connection among juveniles and social institutions as well as provide more opportunities for them. The Center of Budget and Policy Priorities and the Oklahoma Policy Institute are used in order to determine the state's budget situation as well as a stepping off point to determine how to reverse the shortfall. Tax cuts, loopholes, breaks, and a reluctance to increase taxes have all contributed to the budget deficit. Therefore, a major finding is that Oklahoma has a structural budget deficit that is manmade. Due to this structural deficit, a majority of Oklahoma's state agencies have seen reductions in funding, which has a large impact on children as well as other residents. This paper details one possible plan that can serve to reduce juvenile delinquency by providing children their social right to quality education.

Section 1: Overview of Sociological Theory

The theory I chose in support of my policy is Travis Hirschi's social control theory. The reason I chose this theory is because of its emphasis on the social bond. Juveniles spend much of their lives within the school system and are constantly surrounded by their peers. The connection between the juvenile and social institutions such as school plays a large role in determining whether delinquency will be seen as favorable compared to other legitimate actions.

The social bond is characterized by four parts: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Each of these parts play a vital role in connecting the juvenile to the school system, thus creating favorable definitions of legitimate activities and behaviors. Attachment refers to the emotional connection one feels toward other people and groups. Commitment is based on perceived investment

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and reward for conforming to conventional rules as well as the perceived cost for not conforming. This is the rational aspect of the social bond, whereas attachment is the emotional part. Involvement refers to participation in conventional and legitimate activity. In a school, this would be activities such as clubs, athletics, etc. The final part of the social bond is belief, which is the acceptance of a conventional value system.

Hirschi's social control theory is a branch of control theories. These theories are focused on factors that restrain people from delinquency as well as factors that may entice them to commit delinquent acts or crimes. People differ in their levels of control, or restraints, when it comes to delinquency. Hirschi's focus on the social bond is based on the assumption that by increasing peoples' connection to social institutions, delinquency will appear less favorable. This is because those with a stronger social bond will have greater control against delinquency.

Control theories are not the only ones which help justify the policy I am proposing. Strain theory also supports the policy due to its emphasis on how individuals experience strain or stress as well as how they deal with it. There are legitimate methods of dealing with strain and there are delinquent methods. Juveniles can be pressured into committing delinquent acts due to the strain they are experiencing. Thus, if a policy serves to reduce strain experienced by juveniles either directly or indirectly, delinquency rates can also be reduced. Delinquency can be tackled at the individual, community, and structural levels; however, this policy will focus on instituting a macro level change.

The major types of strain include the failure to achieve one's goals and the loss of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli. As stated earlier, juveniles have varying levels of investment in the school system; however, when education is lacking due to budgetary concerns and quality of care decreases, strain increases. This can be explained by multiple factors but I will only focus on one: negative school experiences. This factor falls under the loss of positive stimuli/presentation of negative stimuli. Overall, when schools have fewer resources to spend on students, there are fewer opportunities to engage them. For example, programs have to be shut down, books become outdated, and high quality teachers leave the state. By establishing a minimum budget for education in Oklahoma, I believe

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strain can be reduced as well as serving to foster the social bond juveniles have with the school system.

Section 2: Overview of the Program of Action

The policy that I will analyze is the establishment of a minimum budget for education within the state of Oklahoma. The continual budget cuts for education are alarming and as a result, I believe that this trend must end. The current economic situation for the state is one that has been socially constructed due to man-made decisions. Due to the current political atmosphere, the inclusion of outside support is needed. Continued education cuts and a reluctance to increase taxes has contributed to Oklahoma's education crisis.

For this reason I believe that the Oklahoma Education Association would be helpful in pushing this policy agenda. With their support, I believe that establishing some sort of mandatory minimum spending level for education would be possible. Assuming an economic situation that would not prohibit the passing of this budget, such as the 2008 recession, I believe that education should be allotted much more than it is now. In 2014, a report by the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities showed that from 2008 to 2015, Oklahoma decreased spending per student by 23.6% (Leachmann and Mai 2014). Unfortunately, this trend has continued and that percentage cut is only expected to increase. This needs to stop because juveniles spend huge amounts of time within school systems and it is here that the social bond is formed. When per student spending continues to decline in such a way, class sizes increase, resources disappear, and the level of care needed is not met.

The issue of how Oklahoma has reached this point needs to be addressed. It is not only education that has had its budget reduced year after year but also other state agencies. According to the Oklahoma Policy Institute (2018), "over half of all appropriated agencies (39 of 65) have seen their state funding cut by over 20 percent since 2009." There is evidence of a structural budget deficit since it seems that Oklahoma cannot balance its budget. Rising health care costs, economic shifts, rising tax breaks, and continual tax cuts have all played a role in reducing the state's incoming money (Blatt 2015).

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If the budget is to be balanced and, therefore, provide more resources not only to education and our students but also to other state agencies, our structural budget deficit needs to be addressed. Raising the income tax in a progressive manner, which would mitigate the effect on lower income families, can help increase revenue. Tax loopholes, incentives, and breaks need to be reviewed and narrowed in scope. In fact, the gross production rate on oil and gas in Oklahoma is 3.2%, which is one of the lowest in the nation (Blatt 2017). Furthermore, Oklahoma has made numerous cuts to the top income tax rate, which has resulted in less revenue for the state (Blatt 2016). Oklahoma needs to reverse the current trend toward cutting budget allocations to state agencies in order to ensure a prosperous future for its citizens. There is only so much that fundraising can do to fund education. The Oklahoma tax bill needs to be revised.

Why has Oklahoma gone this route and who has made these decisions? Also, who is involved in the political decision making process? There are multiple theories regarding the nature of how policy is developed. I will be taking a conflict perspective in order to explain how social policy is influenced. Corporations, interest groups, and professional organizations have significant influence in the political making process, which can be seen with the proliferation of tax breaks and incentives to oil and gas in Oklahoma. These companies have a vested interest in ensuring that the system continues to benefit them, therefore, they lobby the state capitol to keep the gross production tax rate low. They have resources and power which is something that many in the education system do not have in large amounts. Furthermore, the perceived threat of these big players in the state's economy leaving the state in search of better deals puts pressure on legislators to not raise taxes. Apprehension against tax hikes has also pressured the state legislature to keep taxes low.

Although it would be preferable if everyone had an equal say in the policy making process, this is unfortunately not the case. People with prestige, power, and resources are able to, in a sense, speak louder than many others who may try to protest political decisions. Hiring lobbyists, creating interest groups, and even giving campaign contributions are ways that people can protect their vested interests. Another way that those with power protect their interests is by temporarily changing policy in response to mass criticism by the less privileged.

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For example, look at the recent Oklahoma teacher walkout that occurred in April 2018. After mass criticism regarding stagnant teacher pay, policymakers increased their salaries. Notice, however, that vested interests were still protected because a major overhaul of the state's tax bill has not occurred, thus, maintaining the status quo.

The policy I am proposing is based on the assumption that increasing state funding toward education as well as establishing a minimum budget will decrease delinquency by improving student involvement and attachment to school. Improving student involvement and attachment to school is important not only as it relates to Hirschi's social control theory, but also because when students become disengaged the likelihood of dropping out increases. In fact, according to Henry et.. al. (2011: 164), "early school disengagement is strongly related to the likelihood of school dropout, as well as to movement along problem behavior trajectories of drug use and crime." When students like school, they form a more effective social bond which serves as a control against delinquency. Teachers play an important role in fostering student engagement/attachment to school. The degree to which teachers support students has a significant influence on their attachment (Hallinan 2008). This supports my argument that higher quality teachers are needed to improve the extent of student engagement.

Furthermore, activities such as after school programs, which have been shown to be beneficial to students as well as serving to decrease delinquency rates, will be preserved. This is separate from the argument that increasing per student funding will improve academic achievement, which a study by Lips and Watkins reveals is false (2008). The point of this policy is not to support the idea that throwing money at a problem will fix it. The allocation and use of money as well as the methods used within school systems are vital for students' academic success; however, there is a point where too little money can begin having negative effects on student engagement. Some characteristics of after school programs shown by Gottfredson, Cross, and Soule (2007) to be effective in reducing delinquency include: small juvenile group size, high structure, and high aggregate staff education levels. This study shows that not all programs are created equally and it is because of this reason that effective use of the budget is vital for this policy's success.

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When teachers can cross the southern border into Texas and make thousands more in an entry-level position, there is definitely a problem. In fact, the average salary in Texas for a high school teacher is \$59,460 compared to \$47,550 in Oklahoma (Rasmussen 2017). Also, when funding is reduced to a point where teachers struggle to live on the salary they are provided something must be done. In order to improve student engagement and, consequently, attachment to legitimate activities and social institutions, the budget for education must stop being cut. For too long Oklahoma has placed too little emphasis or interest in education and this can only have negative repercussions on future generations.

By placing a greater emphasis on adequate resources for the school system, students will experience better academic outcomes and be much more engaged. While this primarily serves to foster the social bond, it also provides better access to economic resources. When juveniles have better resources they have a higher chance of success within not only the job market but the general social sphere. The reduction of strain due to this better access and outcomes serves to reduce delinquency because juveniles have more conventional options for success.

This policy is primarily prevention based rather than rehabilitation based because its goal is to foster juveniles' social bonds who are currently in the school system; however, due to the better quality of care and more resources it will bring it is possible that juveniles engaged in delinquency will experience more controls and thus be rehabilitated. This policy will have an indirect effect on delinquency by making possible the retention of after school programs, teachers, and other resources that school systems depend on state funding for. Simply throwing money at the education system would not be the optimum method to reduce delinquency. By paying heed to relevant research, it is clear that effective after school programs which demonstrate characteristics shown to reduce delinquent outcomes and increase positive peer associations and school attachment are worthy of funding.

This policy proposes that the minimum education budget be set at pre-2008 recession levels. To be precise, the 2005 allocation of \$2,956,750,789 which is a 19.38% increase from the 2017 education allocation (Hofmeister 2017). This should stem the loss of resources and help foster a culture that sees education as

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important for this state's future. Furthermore, this policy has a stipulation requiring a panel to review the public education's budget allocation. The panel will be made up of social scientists who have a vested interest in pouring over relevant research in order to effectively advise the legislature. The panel will also include legislators who will help to guide the allocation process along. By allocating the increased budgetary resources to the public school system as well as effective afterschool programs, delinquency will be reduced.

Section 3: Program Evaluation

In the spirit of social science research, evaluating the effect of the increased budget allocations to various schools and afterschool programs is essential. The point of the policy is to reduce delinquency; however, due to the scope of the program it is imperative that proper evaluation methods are used. Not only will this ensure that the funds are being used efficiently, but it will also broaden the already present research available for social scientists in regards to education and delinquency. This policy will result in complex outcomes besides reducing delinquency and it is for this reason that I suggest research detailing its effects on other areas of interest.

Random sampling of public schools, specifically middle and high schools, should be done in order to strengthen external validity. Once the schools are sampled, further samples of juveniles should be drawn and given anonymous surveys in order to determine any changes in delinquency before and after the policy's enactment. In-depth interviews that go beyond delinquency and learn about the increased resources' impact on students should also be conducted due to the policy's numerous outcomes. The panel made up of primarily social scientists and politicians will also be used as a form of process evaluation in order to shape and refine the allocation of the budget. This will serve to continually improve upon the benefits seen according to proper program evaluations.

An impact analysis as well as an efficiency analysis should also be conducted in order to more accurately measure the program's effect as well as to maximize the benefits in relation to the costs. Factors with the potential to affect the policy's success or failure include: the level of cooperation within the allocation panel, political pressure, school system waste, and budget failure. The

success of the program largely depends on cooperation among the researchers and politicians within the panel, otherwise the funds won't go to schools and after school programs that are most effective at reducing delinquency. Political pressure can result in certain schools and after school programs that aren't effective receiving more funding than they should. School system waste also poses a potential problem due to funds possibly going towards administrative pay rather than school resources and competitive teacher salaries. Finally, a budget failure can truly affect this policy's success because in the midst of an economic downturn cuts will be made.

Section 4: Conclusion

The policy proposed here will create a minimum education budget for Oklahoma at \$2,956,750,789 which is a sizable increase for school systems and after school programs. The creation of an allocation panel for the funds will ensure that the most effective programs are funded. Schools and the juveniles within them will be randomly sampled and interviewed in order to evaluate the program's progress at reducing delinquency. The use of an impact analysis as well as an evaluation analysis will further refine the policy's allocation of funds.

This policy is influenced by Hirschi's social control theory and strain theory; however, there are other factors related to delinquency that are not addressed by these theories. Situational factors also play an important role in delinquency. Although strain theory is useful in explaining how situational factors such as provocation by others and routine activities contribute to delinquency, the budget set by the policy does not address these factors. Characteristics of the community such as residential instability, family disruption, and close proximity to high-crime/economically deprived communities contribute to delinquency as well (Agnew and Brezina 2012). Community characteristics that contribute to delinquency are also not addressed by this policy. Individual traits such as low verbal IQ, learning disabilities, and low self-control have been shown to be conducive to delinquency (Agnew and Brezina 2012). The increased budgetary resources that school systems will receive due to the policy might have the latent effect of addressing individual traits; however, this is a secondary concern to the need for effective after school programs and high quality teachers. The family and delinquent peers also contribute to delinquency, but again this policy is focused on the school rather than

these factors. In order to reduce delinquency, multiple avenues of intervention will need to be explored from the micro to macro level; however, increasing economic opportunities and social attachment can serve as a good starting point.

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Disproportionate Minority Contact

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As long as there has been a justice system, there has also been injustices. The juvenile justice system has come a long way from its start in Cook County, Illinois in 1899 but still continues to face some problems. A major problem associated with the juvenile justice system is disproportionate minority contact, or DMC. In this essay I will discuss the timeline of how the term “disproportionate minority contact” was created by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, key risk factors causing DMC, and strategies being used to fix this problem.

The term disproportionate minority contact “refers to the disproportionate number of minority youth who come into contact with the juvenile justice system” (Cox, Allen, Hanser, & Conrad, 2018). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) defines “minority as youth who are American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, or Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander” (Model Programs Guide Literature Review: DMC). This problem of minority disproportionality was recognized by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). The JJDPA was originally enacted by Congress in 1974, and created some of the first federal juvenile justice programs such as the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and the State Formula Grants Program. The main priorities of these programs were to assist state programs through funding and to set mandates for participating states to follow including reducing the amount of status offenders from institution and detention centers.

Between 1974 and 1984, the JJDPA was reauthorized three times, each time bringing an expansion of requirements to help remove and deinstitutionalize juveniles from detention and jail centers. However, in 1988 when the JJDPA was reauthorized, it included the requirement to address disproportionate minority confinement, one of the first time minorities were actually being represented in the juvenile system. Along with disproportionate minority confinement, the JJDPA set in motion new programs to address gender bias and delinquency prevention methods. Finally, the reauthorization of the act in 2002 not only required funding priorities to

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be spent on evidence based research but also “broadened the scope of the DMC core requirement from ‘disproportionate minority confinement’ to ‘disproportionate minority contact’” (OJJDP). Although this change seems minor because of the change of only one word, it has had a huge impact on the juvenile justice system. The JJDPA changed the way the criminal justice system looks at not only the need to reduce status offenders from confinement and the overrepresentation of minorities in confinement, but most importantly how minorities are overrepresented in coming in contact with the juvenile justice system. Coming into “contact” with the juvenile system, according to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, is classified as “Juvenile justice stages, contact points, or decision points are terms that are used to refer to different points where youth have ‘contact’ with the juvenile justice system. OJJDP mandates that states receiving Title II formula grant funding report on disproportionality or racial disparities for at least nine juvenile justice stages: arrest (law enforcement referral); referral to court; diversion; secure detention; petition filed (charged); adjudication (delinquent, guilty finding); probation supervision; secure confinement; and transfer to adult court (waiver)” (Model Programs Guide Literature Review: DMC). In sum, although the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act did not originally incorporate representation of minorities within the juvenile system, it has evolved by first recognizing disproportionate minority confinement and finally recognizing the problem of minority overrepresentation in every aspect of the juvenile justice system.

Research has identified many risk factors that could be influencing DMC. Some of the most researched and validated are that minority youth may commit crimes more often than are more serious than Caucasian youth, the lower socioeconomic class and education of minorities, and racial discrimination by the police and juvenile justice system. Kakar explains that, “A frequent explanation of the overrepresentation of minority juveniles is that these youth are committing more offenses and/or more serious offenses, and thus, their representation in the juvenile justice system reflects this differential offending pattern” (Kakar, 2006). In other words, given that minority youth commit more crimes in general, there is a higher chance of coming into contact with the juvenile justice system. This factor is directly related to arrest rates by police or referrals to others in the juvenile system that end up with a juvenile being processed into the system. Crime reports,

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which this research is based on, can only be made based on concrete evidence of a juvenile being processed through the system. Though multiple sources could provide evidence of minorities committing more crimes, it is essentially impossible to find truly accurate crime numbers committed. These reports cannot take into account the amount of delinquents never caught, delinquents caught by police but released without being processed, and other social factors invalidating results. One way many reports calculate crime is by using a calculated Relative Rate Index, or RRI. An RRI is a matrix of varying elements within the justice system that youth come into contact with. At each step of the process, the race of each juvenile is determined and this information is then used to compare the rate at which each race group comes into contact with the system per 100 or 1,000 total “contacts” by all juveniles. Therefore crime statistics like the national RRI by OJJDP which includes case processing of all juveniles in, is only based off the juveniles caught by the system 2015 (Puzzanchera & Hockenberry, 2018). This suggests that it should not be used in determining the amount of crime because although it does show overrepresentation of minorities in almost every category, it is not an accurate representation of the amount of crime committed.

The second research finding is that minority youth commit more violent crimes therefore being detained and processed more often than Caucasian youth. This idea, however, is backed by various, accurate studies of violent crime rates among youth. The UCR produced by the FBI is one of the nation’s top crime statistic reports. According to the FBI, violent offenses, or part 1b offenses, include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. A UCR study done in 2001 shows the non-white to white ratios of each violent crime with murder being 4.933, rape at 2.780, robbery at 5.773, and aggravated assault at 2.603 (Piquero & Brame, 2008). Based on this, not only are minority rates higher than white rates of violent crime, they blow white violent crime rates out of the water. Of course, not all statistics are completely accurate because delinquents may not have been caught or reported. However, in the case of violent crimes, these statistics are more accurate because there would not be any stationhouse agreements or any other informal version of letting the juvenile go with a “slap on the wrist.” These violent crime will almost always constitute processing a juvenile into the system through arrest. Given the nature of the crime, this does seem a valid point. Although not all statistics will have complete accuracy when showing total crime rates or serious crime rates of

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juveniles, they are seemingly unanimous in showing crime in totality being higher by minority youth.

The second risk factor involved in DMC is that as a whole, minority social class and education levels are lower than that of the white youth causing higher crime rates or increased juvenile justice contacts. Social class is most often related to a persons or families income level. According to the U.S. Census Bureau's annual median household income by race from 1968 to 2013, median household income for Asians was \$68,636; for whites, it was \$57,009; Hispanic (any race) income was \$39,005; and black household income was \$33,321 (U.S. Census Bureau). Although Asians, who are considered a minority, do receive the highest annual median income, this study still clearly shows the vast difference between median incomes of Asians and whites compared to blacks and Hispanics, both of which are the majority of the minority youth disproportionately represented. This income level, or social class, difference can be directly related to opportunities provided to minority youth to protect and prevent them from entering the juvenile justice system. With more money comes more protective factors and opportunities to thrive and vice versa. Risk factors for minority youth produced by lower class families can include a harsher family environment leading to less parenting and more abuse/neglect, living in poverty and run down neighborhoods, having peers of bad influence from the same lower social class, and less money to join healthy extracurricular activities. All of these factors either directly or indirectly lead to more crime/juvenile justice contact or to the second part of this total risk factor, poor education.

Poor education is largely connected to lower social class, and has a strong correlation with crime. Poor education can be attributed to either juveniles not attending school through dropping out or being expelled or to the actual school system itself. According to a Brookings study, "educational experiences for minority students have continued to be substantially separate and unequal. Two-thirds of minority students still attend schools that are predominantly minority, most of them located in central cities and funded well below those in neighboring suburban districts. Recent analyses of data prepared for school finance cases in Alabama, New Jersey, New York, Louisiana, and Texas have found that on every tangible measure—from qualified teachers to curriculum offerings—schools

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serving greater numbers of students of color had significantly fewer resources than schools serving mostly white students" (Darling-Hammond, 2016). Not only is the justice system failing minorities but so are the school systems most of them attend. Overall, this DMC risk factor can be seen as a domino effect, starting with low income/social class and leading to multiple other risk factors associated with it including education which has a compelling correlation with crime, ultimately leading to higher crime rates and more contact with the juvenile justice system.

The last factor associated with disproportionate minority contact is racial discrimination by the juvenile justice system as a whole. Usually, the first step of coming into contact with the justice system is through the police. Although police discrimination, along with juvenile justice discrimination, cannot be accurately measured, it can be partially shown by police arrest rates of white and minority youth for the same crime in the same area. One such study comes from the South Carolina Department of Public Safety who reported that in 2012, "The uniform traffic ticket arrest rate for Black juveniles was 1.8 times the uniform traffic ticket arrest rate for White juveniles and the uniform traffic ticket arrest rate for Minority juveniles was 1.5 times the arrest rate for White juveniles" (South Carolina Statistical Analysis Center). Although this report is an accurate representation of minority disproportionality arrest, it does not detail specifics of the traffic tickets. Another problem with this study, along with others, is that arrest rates within certain areas can be greatly influenced by the proportion of minorities living there. Arrest rates could be higher for specific races in certain areas but that could be because that area is predominantly populated by minorities. Another viewpoint that is associated with police discrimination is that in "bad areas," or low income/social class neighborhoods which are known for their crime rates, police are more on edge and are quicker to deal out punishment in hopes of reducing crime in that area. In doing so, arrest rates go up in these areas. The second factor in this possible DMC cause is racial discrimination within the juvenile court system. Not only are arrest rates typically higher for minorities, but juvenile minorities are usually processed further into the court system than juvenile whites and the dispositions for minorities are usually harsher. The OJJDP refers to this as bias theory, which "argues that minority youth are more likely than white youth to suffer harsher consequences at each stage of the juvenile justice decision-making process because the system treats minority youth differently (and more punitively)" (Model Programs Guide

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Literature Review: DMC). A theoretical result of this biased processing, as I referenced early, is disproportionate minority “confinement” and although a youth has already “come into contact” with the juvenile justice system by the point of confinement, it could show that if one part of the system is biased then so may be every other part. Though this may not be outwardly racist, some studies do show a seemingly biased outcome of minorities who come into contact with the system. So along with minority youth supposedly committing more/serious crimes and disproportionately being from a lower social class with more poor education, racial discrimination by the juvenile justice system might be another risk factor tied in with DMC.

Since DMC has been recognized as a problem, there are some methods and strategies being used to reduce this problem. The OJJDP methods are based on their DMC intervention plan which utilizes the following steps: one, design a comprehensive, multimodal approach, when feasible; two, prioritize strategies to focus on critical decision points; three, choose interventions that the community is ready to implement; four, use evidence based strategies and draw on the successful experiences of current DMC initiatives, as applicable; and, five, to evaluate the strategy's effectiveness (Model Programs Guide Literature Review: DMC). Along with their intervention plan, they detail three specific strategies including direct services of youth needs, training juvenile justice and law enforcement personnel, and changing parts of the justice system thought to be contributing to DMC. Direct service methods can include prevention, intervention, and diversion programs used not only to help minority youth steer clear of the system at early ages but also to help juveniles already in the system have better opportunities than being put into confinement. A specific prevention programs like the Minority Youth Violence Prevention programs works to combine public health with community policing to help prevent violence among minority youth. An example of an intervention program would be wilderness camps which are also used as diversion programs. These programs provide outdoor activities and opportunities to develop teamwork through hard work to rehabilitate youth offenders. Diversion programs are used to help offenders by presenting opportunities of diverted “punishments” where they can go complete community-based programs through community service and involvement in order to steer clear of confinement. On the part of training personnel, maybe the most popular is the DMC Technical Assistance Manual

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offered by the OJJDP explaining DMC and how it can be found and fixed within the juvenile system. Finally, for changing parts of the juvenile justice system, most methods include foundations set up through federal programs that offer grants to competing states or services. The grants require strict acknowledgement of the problems within the system and positive changes to those problems in order to receive the grant. Although all of these programs and methods are a great step towards fixing this problem, most have a relatively low success rate. While most justice systems do cooperate and want to help fix DMC, funding is low in most systems and high success rate methods are scarce.

Disproportionate minority contact is a significant problem not only in the U.S. but also in other countries as well. Although not much has worked in reducing or fixing this problem, it has at least been brought to light and awareness increased. This may not directly fix it, but the more people who know of the problem, then more people may be willing to help solve it. The studies cited here are all reliable sources but that does not mean they all pertain to the exact results of some DMC problems and correlations. While most of the factors can be singularly identified, the problem is more akin to a web with each problem connected to each other. The complication with all these problems being interrelated is that there is no clear way to fix one and move on to the next problem because they are all interrelated. This might explain why DMC has been a problem for so long is only increasing. In order to solve or help reduce this problem, further research and innovative strategies will be needed.

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