



CAMERON UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE  
RESEARCH JOURNAL OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL  
SCIENCE





## **Cameron University Undergraduate Research Journal of History and Political Science**

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# NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Wendy Whitman Cobb, Courtney Barden, and Josey Dennis

One of the things that often keep students away from classes in political science or history is not only the amount of reading involved but the amount of research and writing. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of classes in these fields is that students undertake their own independent research, a task that is at once daunting and exciting. Students must determine everything from the research topic and question to how to go about answering it and then assembling the background literature. Students are often overwhelmed and exhausted but the end product is usually something to be proud of: a unique and independent examination of a topic that may or may not have been explored before.

CHiPS is dedicated to celebrating that research and publishing the best of it that has been performed in history, political science, and geography at Cameron University.

At every step of the publication of this journal, students have been involved. This means that students not only have written the articles published here but have reviewed them, edited them, and been involved in preparing them for publication. While faculty have been involved in also providing reviews and guiding the publication process, CHiPS is about the work that our undergraduate students put into their education.

The articles in this inaugural issue of CHiPS run the gamut of topics. Pedro Ramos, a graduating senior in political science, explores the effects of political polarization on the American economy finding that perhaps polarization may not be an entirely negative phenomenon. Mackenzie Daley, a junior political science major, examines treatment of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Turkey. Her analysis demonstrates the seriousness of the crisis confronting

not just the Middle East but Europe and America as well. Finally, Kelly High, a junior history major, provides a comprehensive look at how America treated anarchists in the first Red Scare immediately following World War I. She reminds us that America has often been afraid of ideas they do not seem to understand, a lesson that is as applicable today as it was 100 years ago.

As the editors for this inaugural edition, we would like to thank the faculty of the Department of History and Government for supporting the establishment of the journal and participating in reviewing the pieces. We would especially like to thank Dr. Roni Kay O'Dell and Dr. Sarah Janda who allowed us into their capstone classes to ask for student reviewers. As for those student reviewers, we couldn't have done it without you. Thank you to Dreama Black, Brandon Clark, Tiffany Watson, and Brenda Weber.

We would also like to acknowledge and thank the Katherine D. Lacy Endowed Lectureship in History and the James O. "Diz" and June Pursley Barnett Endowed Lectureship in

History for providing funding for the publication and printing of this journal.

Finally, we would like to thank our fellow students for being willing to engage in this process. There would be no CHiPS without the research they produce and the papers they submit. It is a brave thing to share research with the rest of the community and these students represent the best that Cameron University has to offer.

We hope that in the years to come, CHiPS will be able to continue celebrating research and begin a fine tradition of showing the community the talent our students can bring to the table.

# POLARIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON AMERICAN POLITICS

Pedro Ramos

Senior Political Science Major

When attempting to decide what knowledgeable research I could provide to the field of political science, it was not an easy answer to come up with. As an undergraduate attempting to earn a degree in poli sci, as we have coined it, I truly felt like there were no more questions left unanswered. Sad to say, but by this point I felt as if we as political scientist have run out of new topics to debate and I felt as if we were beating a few dead horses in an attempt to reinvent the wheel or find some hidden clue that was not to be found in some of these topics. (By the way, I assure you no animals were hurt in my attempt at an analogy.) What I found was that the topic of polarization in American politics is not yet drained of its natural resource and still has some good research to provide. So in thinking of what about this topic was left unanswered or not yet fully completed I was led down a path that not only discussed polarization in American politics but also its possible ties to the American economy. I feel as though now it is my job to answer an important question that has not yet been asked: How does political

polarization effect the American economy? This topic has yet to scratch the surface as far as research and its findings may be more important than we now know.

My hypothesis is that political polarization will have a negative effect on the American economy, I believe this because my assumption is that a division in the political parties that run the government will cause the two to drift further away from each other leading to less cooperation and compromise on policies and issues that will pertain to the economy of the United States. This negative effect of the lack of cooperation should only breed more negative outcomes within the government and cause the economy to suffer in the process. My belief is that in order for the economy to prosper in America it will take cooperation of both political parties as well as the politicians who identify themselves as independent. Without said cooperation, I see no other outcome for the economy of the United States other than that of negative consequences.

### Literature Review

When discussing polarization, one must first define the term for which it is being used and provide the context in which it will be used. What is polarization? At first glance the thought that polarization exists in American politics seems to lead to a simple and definite answer, but there is simply one problem with that. The problem lies in defining the term "polarization" in the context of politics. It would seem as though we can come up with the answer quite quickly with that handy-dandy Google search bar. The scholarly answer to the question "What is polarization in terms of politics" is something along the lines of the separation of political ideals to conceptual limits. Polarization in the context of politics is better defined by the Pew Research Center, which has done extensive research in the last few years on this exact topic. According to the PRC, political polarization is about the divide in political ideologies between Democrats and Republicans, or liberals and conservatives, respectively, whichever term suits the reader the best. But the PRC goes on to include in the definition the idea of partisan antipathy, which they believe is deeper and more extensive than it has been at any point in the last two decades (Pew Research Center). While it's not breaking news that Democrats and Republicans dislike one another, it is quite alarming that there are more members of each party whose negative

views towards the other side have become more passionate. The PRC also tells how having this partisan antipathy directly correlates with political participation, so with opposition growing more negative within the two groups it is not hard to understand how the two parties or ideologies are pulling further away from each other.

When determining whether or not polarization exists, it is helpful to understand how polarization is measured; political scientists use DW NOMINATE scores introduced by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Hetherington states that the DW NOMINATE score is bound between -1 and +1 for methodological reasons. There is an example chart that shows the ideology of the House of Representatives, 109th Congress DW nominate scores. The scores show the variant between -1 and +1 as well as showing a cluster of member on both sides of the spectrum in between -0.2 and -0.5 as well as between 0.3 and 0.7; with both sides having the most members in -0.4 and 0.4, respectively (Hetherington 2009). These clusters in the scores represent the polarity of the given subjects showing how the DW NOMINATE scores measure congressional polarization. In another article on measuring polarization, Tom Clark verifies the DW NOMINATE method stating that one calculates the distance between the medians of the dispersal of officials in each political party. This is done by calculating the

absolute distance, in DW NOMINATE space, between the two parties for each chamber. But Clark also presents another form of measurement, which involves characteristics of opinion distributors. This method uses kurtosis and variances as the variables to be measured, but this method has been proven to have limitations (Clark 2009). What makes this important is the fact that it shows that there was at least another attempt at a logical method of measurement, proving the importance of the topic of polarization to the extent that there has been more than one verifiable attempt at measuring polarization efficiently.

After defining what polarization is, we must know whether it actually exists in American politics or not. This is an interesting topic, as there are countless amounts of reports on the topic in many different contexts. When researching this area, one of the first pieces of work that comes up is entitled "Is Polarization a Myth?" by Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders (2008). This work attempts to show that polarization amongst the American public is due to participation, not the lack thereof. This is because they believe that there has been a significant increase in the achievement of education, specifically a college education. They also believe that the growing force of ideological differences among political elites has caused an increase in the level of ideological awareness by the public. This article

uses data acquired from the American National Election Studies as well as national exit polls to test the five major claims by Fiorina, of which they attempt to disprove. The first claim is that the American public is essentially moderate, which they debunk with results that show the American public has increasingly begun to thinking ideologically, more now than in past decades. They go on to state, "Fiorina's claim that Americans 'instinctively seek the center' also ignores important differences ideological thinking within the public" (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, 2). They show that the members of the public that were drawn to the center were the voters that were the least interested, least informed, and non-active politically, which proves that the members of society that are the most polarized are the citizens that are more engaged with the government. The second claim by Fiorina is that partisan polarization was traditionally known as more of a phenomenon for the elite class which also happens to be more politically involved; but Abramowitz and Saunders actually dispute that, arguing the ideological preference of the people who identify with the political parties, not just the elite, differ quite harshly as well. The truth is that party identification has become tied in with ideological identification and this is not confined to a small group of activists, but instead to all members who identify with the party.

Claim number three is geographical polarization, in which Fiorina argues has only increased slightly in the last few decades, this article proves otherwise showing that since the 1960s red states have actually become redder while blue states have become bluer. This, in turn, has led to states with more electoral votes than others becoming more solid in either the red or blue color. The fourth claim dealt with social cleavages, but for this research the focus will be on the religious polarization aspect of the claim. Religion is responsible for the largest differences between the red and blue state voters, there is a clear divide inside the electorate that is solely based on religious adherence.

Attempting to stay away from the racial aspect of this situation the article did point out two things worth mentioning that were tailored to the white voting base. First, political attitudes have become associated with religious observance, and two, that religiosity has a stronger influence on the choice of candidate than any other social characteristic for white voters. Finally, the last claim in which they disprove in order to verify the existence of polarization is voter engagement and participation. This article shows that the increased activities in the political campaigns with such as things like bumper stickers or signs in the yard were the activities of the more politically polarized voters. The example used for this claim is the 2000

and 2004 elections but as far as this source is concerned the point has been proven, polarization is no myth, it truly exists (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, 2).

In a final attempt to debunk any myth that polarization does not exist, Sean Theriault (2008) takes on the task of identifying the causes of polarization in American politics. Theriault declares that states are more polarized now than they were thirty years ago, despite the fact that he acknowledges that it does not necessarily occur to the same extent in all fifty states. Theriault provides four broad categories that provide explanations for polarization amongst the political parties: redistricting, political and geographic sorting of constituents, party activist extremism, and institutional change. He states that if one would directly compare the collection of the same voters in both the old and new districts then the comparison will directly reflect the group of constituents within certain districts and show how the redistricting has made an effect. It does not take a political science major to see how redistricting could add to polarization by lining up alike minds more directly. Statistics have shown, that after redistricting, new districts are more polarized than the ones they replace; the conclusion also advocates that redistricting has been the cause of some ten to 20% of party polarization over the last three decades (Theriault 2008).

An important note to take from this book is that the author believes that the majority share of party polarization is due to a procedural divide between the two major political parties within Congress. The leadership of the parties know that they have two weapons at their disposal in terms of keeping constituents in line with the parties' ideologies, rewards and punishments; reward those members who enact the party's agenda by helping obtain more campaign contributions and punish those who don't follow the same footsteps by giving out committee positions that are either not the most desirable or more deserving of other members. The leaders of the parties become stronger when the respective parties become internally more uniform and more externally assorted.

What has been happening in the House and Senate now is polarization is growing; the party caucuses have become 47% more polarized in the House and 33% more in the Senate, committee leadership of both has become 39% and 38% more polarized respectively, and the party leaders have become 21% and 32% more polarized (Theriault 2008). With more party polarization, the selection of leadership has become more polarized as well. Once the polarized leaders take charge they are then able to take advantage of procedures, closed rules in the House and complex Unanimous Consent Agreements in the Senate for three separate reasons. The first reason

for obtaining strict procedures is because they can aid in streamlining the decision making process. Second, the leadership can implement procedures in order to protect certain members or hurt others by leaving them will difficult votes to cast, and finally the procedures come with the ability to dictate the outcome reached on the floor. In Theriault's closing points, he states "as the parties' respective constituents have become more homogenous, the majority party has been less dependent upon cross-pressured members" (Theriault 2008, 153). In other words, polarization can equal power, and no one in either party wants to miss out on an opportunity to gain the upper hand over the other.

The next step in the process of examining polarization is to identify some of the causes, which were lightly touched on in the previous topic. Starting with redistricting, McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009) address the idea of gerrymandering as a possible cause for polarization. The findings of this article determined that despite having no direct evidence to the fact, partisan gerrymandering is one of the premier suspects in seeking the cause of polarization. Partisanship itself makes a captivating circumstantial case for the increase in polarization. In order to gain more of a personal advantage, politicians have engaged themselves in raw power politics; this coincides with a decline in electoral competitiveness within Congress to show that together

these two spectacles work to provide greater polarization. Adding to this, the authors provide another explanation for polarization; the disappearance of the “one-party South” in accordance with an increase in geographical sorting on political as well as social attitudes (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2009).

The same authors also collaborated on a book entitled *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches* in which they provide a few points that entertain the cause or surge of polarization in American politics. The liberal-conservative dimension of the voting base is one of the last standing major dimensions; to compound this, the dispersal of positions of constituents on this dimension has increased. The average position of Democrats and Republicans have become more separated over time causing the moderates of the parties to nearly be wiped out. This extinction extends to those Democrats that may have been conservative and those Republicans that may have been liberal. They even go on to say that income inequality is a big factor in polarization giving four reasons they believe led to the possibility of an increase in income stratification. The first reason is the response effect, meaning that there can be a chronological surge in the coefficient for income in their model of partisanship. This may be due to an escalation in the salience of economic issues as well as party polarization on

economic policy issues. The second reason may be the inequality effect, which provides an explanation for growth in stratification, working along with the response effect, this effect of inequality is what makes the upper class richer and the lower class poorer. The third reason is that amplified stratification is a result of a change in the joint distribution of income and demographic characteristics, resulting in pro-Republican groups having a higher income and the pro-Democratic groups having lower levels of income. The final reason goes hand in hand with the previous reason in the sense that the groups of citizens with higher incomes have moved towards the Republican side while the poorer groups have shifted towards the Democrats (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 2).

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal provide two great examples to represent income stratification in America, the first being females, where there has been an increase in single females in the last few decades; these females subsequently have gone on to become a larger share of the lowest quintile of economic standing. For this reason, single females have drifted towards the Democratic Party. On the other side of the spectrum, Southerners are represented more in the higher quintile thus providing a form of realignment that has added to stratification. Another possible cause for polarization identified by these authors is the acceleration in campaign



spending, for which they provide two hypotheses. The first is that an increase in financial demands makes congressional candidates more attentive to the positions of extreme interest groups and two, an increase in campaign spending has increased polarization by making ideological contributors more willing to contribute than ever due to increased stakes of winning each election.

What this book says about polarization is interesting in that it may produce gridlock that affects the government's capacity to reduce inequality, "polarization accentuates gridlock, that is, status quo bias" (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 2). Adding to the effect of candidates and the elite upper class, author Morris Fiorina states that it is clear that elite polarization has led to amplified acknowledgment of party dissimilarities and a keen sense that the outcome really matters. He goes on to state that party sorting is as well a cause of polarization, going on to say that the parties have become sorted more on cultural and moral issues. The American public has divided into two value camps, the culturally orthodox and the culturally progressive; the first of which holds traditional religious views and the modern having a more secular, realistic view of morality (Fiorina 2008). This increase in a moral divide makes the other forms of polarization easier to accomplish as voters are already divided on basic moral issues to begin

with.

After discussing the causes of polarization, there is really nowhere else to go from here but directly to the effects. In "Income Inequality, Party Polarization, and Roll-Call Voting in the US Senate," James Garand (2010) provides more support for McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal's argument about income inequality and how it directly relates to polarization, specifically with senators. According to Garand, United States senators from states with higher levels of income inequality tend to be more polarized than senators from states with less inequality. Garand documents the shift in the level of polarization in the so-called roll-call behavior exhibited by U. S. senators. From 1877 to 2005, there was a downward turn in Democrats' roll-call conservatism while there has been a surge in the Republicans' roll-call conservatism. Garand measured the mean of the DW NOMINATE score of senators from the years of 1963 to 2002 in order to present a trend in Senate party polarization; this test shows a clear extensive rise in polarization of both political parties of the last forty years. The mean of conservative senators has shifted from 0.271 to 0.391 on the side of conservatism while on the opposite side of the scale the Democrats have shifted in the liberal direction from -0.279 to -0.405 (Garand 2010). Garand also demonstrates a growth of polarization, showing how the DW NOMINATE score has moved from

0.461 in the 1970s to 0.796 at the turn of the century, thus showing how the Senate has gone down a path that has led to more polarization (ibid.). Polarization in any aspect of government breeds an environment to foster the growth of polarization in other aspects as well. Overall, Garand hypothesizes that there is a direct tie between polarization and senators from states with high inequality in income as well as the mass public being more polarized under the same inequality circumstances. The author says that state electorates are directly responsible for selecting U.S. senators, proving the probability that senators are swayed by changes in the income dissemination of their home states (ibid.).

Looking for more effects of polarization, Brzezinski (2013) discusses how polarization may affect economic growth. This research looks at polarization in a different domain, an economic domain, which surprisingly could manifest itself in strikes, demonstrations, and political instability; this conflict has direct consequences on economic growth. This leads Brzezinski into another theory about the middle class being stable and sizable which becomes a source of new entrepreneurs who convey the values of the middle class to higher class levels all the while creating a demand for quality consumer good which will boost the overall production of goods for lower level classes (Brzezinski 2013). This leads,

then, to a disappearing middle class that has also been discussed by others.

Alan Abramowitz provides a different point of view on the topic of polarization in American politics. In his book, *The Disappearing Center*, he argues that polarization in American politics is not in fact between the far right and far left sides of the political spectrum but rather the divide is between voters who are politically involved and those who are not. He believes that these citizens that are engaged politically closely reflect the ideals of democratic citizenship. Unlike most people who believe that polarization is a sign of the elite class having a disconnection with the public, Abramowitz argues that polarization is more a product of the elites having a connection with the politically active parts of society. Furthermore, Abramowitz believes that polarization serves the public's interest as well as their participation in politics by giving the voters a clear cut choice to make between two sides that are not so alike; this is what leads to the theory of the disappearing center because the clear cut decisions to make draw the constituents further away from each other (Abramowitz 2010).

The author goes on to discuss polarization in social groups, elections, and the electorate as well as how it deals with representation and democratic governance. Abramowitz discusses the engaged members of

society and polarization during the Obama administration. Aiding in the disappearance of the middle class is the fact that some Americans have little to no interest in politics or government issues that they are not up to date on current issues or political leaders thus making it easier for them to fall into a system of voting for whoever the party promotes the best especially since the average citizen only votes occasionally. This makes for a more polarized public, caused by polarization amongst the parties that reflect brighter on the non-politically educated members of society. This is proven more so by evidence that the highly engaged constituents are much more polarized in their policy preference than members who are engaged less; on top of that the low-engagement group of citizens were not consistent in their preferences. On the other hand, the constituents that are highly engaged group were fairly consistent causing a cycle of growth for polarization as the engaged members stick to who or what they know and the members who only occasionally vote go with the most decorated candidate (Abramowitz 2010).

Still on the topic of effects of polarization, author Daniel Coffey provides an article that ties into my argument that polarization aids in the production of more polarization. In this article he states that the higher the level of competition between the two parties, the more the two drift into their conservative and liberal sides

respectably. His research is based on a party platform ideology, and finds that the state parties are actually highly divided on different aspects (Coffey 2011). Further, Lindqvist (2010) looks at the relationship between political polarization and public spending in America. He finds that political polarization is more predominate in smaller government systems in democratic countries such as the United States as well as discovering that political polarization, in terms of party structure and opinions, are consistent with the player veto theory. According to George Tsebelis' veto player theory, if the ideological difference between the two parties is great then the political parties are more likely to veto political decisions (ibid.).

With all this research into what may cause polarization and what its effects are, researchers still have yet to touch on an idea that has yet to be fully explored, specifically the impact that social media has on the polarization of voters, both fully engaged and those who may only vote occasionally when they feel politically active. With the way that social media is set up, citizens now have the ability to display one's true beliefs, both political and religious, without the consequence of having to answer for those beliefs. The user keeps some anonymity by being able to "share" posts that are not made by them, giving them an out if they are ever to be truly challenged on the topic. This ability to remain anonymous is also

able to be kept through what are known as "catfish" accounts where the user is under a false identity for one reason or another, furthering their ability to repost extremist ideas on politics or religious without having to answer for those posts directly. More often than not, the posts that are being shared represent the more extreme side of the ideology that is being represented, furthering the influence or polarization down to the individual level, in a world that is increasingly more online than in real time.

Aiding polarization further is the phenomena where online "friends" are not questioning each other on these posts in fear of being removed from their friend list and having a smaller number of online friends. This sort of confrontation is not welcomed in everyday face to face conversation yet once one gets online these posts are more frequent than status updates of their friends. It gives a false sense of courage, allowing extreme activist to say online what they will not say out loud, inadvertently this leads to further polarization on the individual level of society. In the past, there were clichés that states politics as one of the major things not to discuss on a first date, that is how private people have kept their beliefs for years, until now. By keeping one's political and religious beliefs behind closed doors it leaves more room for people to fall into a moderate class of voting. Many people understand the aspect of jumping on the

bandwagon when it comes to sports teams but this too is true for political leaders as well. By seeing more extreme posts and less, if any, moderate post, polarization begins to widen between voters of both parties. Giving the voting base the ability to discuss the ideologically extreme viewpoints of politics and religion without any repercussions or having to answer any questions as to their stance, fosters the environment suitable for the growth or polarization amongst voters of both the fully and occasionally engaged realm of politics.

Much of the research noted above has focused on how the economy has affected polarization. However, the question can also be reversed to ask how polarization has effected the economy. Polarization's impact on the economy arrives in different zones of the economy's defense. One of the biggest impacts it makes is the occupational skill distribution, this is compounded as per capita employment in middle-skilled jobs vanish. As citizens are shuffled into high and low-skill leveled jobs and more money gets put into research for robotics, it is no surprise that the jobs in the middle level are beginning to disappear. When the workforce is less, the wages reflect that of supply and demand by becoming lesser as well instead of going up. Polarization has an effect on the economy by changing the way business cycles recover. Since the 1980s polarization has led to the long-lasting

loss of monotonous jobs, especially during times of recession; which has traditionally a quick recovery time due to those middle-skilled jobs coming back. In the aftermath of the recession of the 2000s, there is a jobless recovery, essentially no recovery at all (Jaimovich 2012). Polarization in the workforce leads to inequality in wages between those who shifted to the high and low-skill leveled jobs which was no revelation. The lack of a mid-level workforce along with changing dissemination of job demands supports in understanding polarization of the wage structure (Autor 2006). With the parting of the workforce to upper and lower level jobs and the divide in the wage differential leads on one logical response by the citizens that directly effects the economy: less spending.

### **Research Design**

This analysis will focus on two specific variables: political polarization and the economy. The independent variable, polarization, will be measured through the DW NOMINATE scores of members of Congress from 1965 until 2014. Polarization is measured as the absolute distance between the median DW NOMINATE score of each party. The economy, being the dependent variable, will be measured by GDP over the same time period. I am choosing this method of measurement because I believe it to be the most accurate method of measurement for the variables which I have deemed critical to the research.

Thus by going back fifty years and measuring the economy in this manner I should be able to determine if my hypothesis is correct or if the American economy has something else to say on the matter.

My hypothesis is that polarization will have a negative effect on the American economy by driving the polarization of funds amongst the citizens. Polarization has an effect on how citizens vote and what they vote on, some people tend to vote with their pocketbooks. Division between funds will cause those who have money to save and those who don't have money to continue without it. This gap will only grow causing the economy to suffer in the process and I to prove this in my research. I must also mention how politicians may influence the economy. When polarization is high, parties may not be able to work together to pass legislation. For example, within the last few years there has been one major government shutdown and many policy areas where politicians need to get laws passed and they cannot. This fact could cause the economy to suffer therefore I expect the GDP to go down when polarization goes up.

There will be three control variables that will be taken into account for their effect on the economy: unemployment, consumer confidence, and political party. As for unemployment, the government argues that unemployment breeds more

unemployment thereby hurting the economy. The citizens' loss of the ability to purchase by being unemployed, reduces the amount of consumers in the economy, risking the jobs of more workers. In other words, unemployed workers become a whole loss for the country (Unemployment 2015).

The Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) is a survey conducted by the Conference Board that measures how enthusiastic or distrustful consumers are of the economy in the future. The idea supporting this method of measurement is that optimistic consumers stimulate the economy while doubtful consumers can depress the economy (Consumer 2003). This has obvious effects on the economy that may cause a sway in the statistics in one direction or another, less consumers in the market makes for less stimulation of the economy. This possible impact on the economy must be taken into account during the research along with unemployment.

The final control variable to take into account is political party in power. To measure this, I will have three variables: the number of Democrats in the House of Representatives, the number of Democrats in the Senate, and party affiliation of the president. By seeing the numbers one may be able to come up with logical hypotheses about how the majority party uses its numbers to sway decisions one way or another. The

party affiliation of the president also aids in showing how the party with more control uses the power of numbers at their disposal. These numbers will be used to help accurately determine how the dependent variable, the economy, is effected by polarization by taking out some of the factors that may influence the numbers in a less than accurate direction. By having a more specific look at the economy of the last fifty years, the research will be able to more accurately determine how much influence polarization has over the economy.

### Data Analysis

Before looking through all of the final results, I first observed if there was a correlation between polarization and GDP and the results were quite shocking. The Pearson correlation value was a statistically significant 0.989 showing a strong correlation between the two. Given this, a regression analysis is essential in order to include the other potential variables in the analysis.

Table 1 shows some interesting relationships among the variables. When looking at the variables, three are significant. When polarization grows amongst members of Congress the GDP grows. When looking at the Democratic members of the House and Senate, both are significant but in different directions. As the number of Democrats in the House go up, so does GDP but when the number of Democrats in the Senate goes up, GDP decreases. The

adjusted  $R^2$  value shows that the variables in the model help to explain 98% of the variation in the dependent variable, further demonstrating the intimacy of the relationship between polarization and the American economy.

**Table 1: Regression Analysis**

Variable	Coefficient (Std.
Constant	-4.402 (1.747)**
Consumer	-.001 (1.747)
Democrats in	.017 (.005)***
Democrats in Senate	-.058 (.018)***
President is	-.237 (.175)**
Unemployment	-.045 (.053)
Polarization	18.679 (.587)***
R <sup>2</sup> =0.986	
Adj. R <sup>2</sup> =0.984	

\*\*\*<0.001, \*\*<.01, \*<0.05

Given the unsuccessfulness of my hypothesis, one may begin to wonder what may be causing the relationship between the variables. One of the first theories may be connected with increased globalization and the effects that that may have, not only on the economy, but also an effect in the realm of politics as well. With an

increased flow of services, capital, and goods globally, one can see how economic globalization can have a positive effect on income as well; furthermore, international trade may strengthen economic growth. This could have an effect on the economy that was unaccounted for in my original research. Now as more of these goods and services are traded internationally the effects may begin to trickle down into politics as well. For the voters, they may begin to see the increases in wealth and such as expect that to trickle its way down to the individual people as well, not just the country as a whole. This aspect of globalization applies pressure to the politicians to provide better welfare policies for the people (Mukherjee and Kriekhaus 2012).

The introduction of free trade agreements, NAFTA in particular, may have had an effect on the economy in a positive manner yet a negative effect on politics thus helping the economy while spurring more polarization in the process. NAFTA was approved by Congress but not without its fair share of heated political debate between the two major parties that run the government, this debate was justified on both sides with many concerns and may have led to an increase in polarization between the two while bettering the economy of the United States as a whole in the process. NAFTA had a huge impact on the countries involved and Mexico was the biggest concern for most politicians as they felt

that Mexico had the least to bring to the table while also have the most to gain from the agreement. Nonetheless, the agreement was passed and it had an effect on agriculture, the auto industry, textiles and apparel, and subsequently gains from regional integration (Burfisher, Robinson, and Thierfelder 2001).

If I were to revisit this research in the future, I believe I would need to add more aspects into the equation when it comes to the variables involved. When conducting research one may choose the most identifiable independent and dependent variables, although as proven by my hypothesis being totally incorrect, there may be some hidden variables that are vital to the research; in this case increased globalization and international trade agreements have a huge role in the effects on the economy. The way that globalization affects the economy will go unnoticed if one focuses solely on polarization having a bigger impact than what it actually does, losing sight of this factor lead to an incorrect hypothesis. NAFTA single handedly showed how it affected the economy in a positive manner while spurring more polarization in the process. This, to me, is the factor in which made my hypothesis incorrect; the lack of foresight to judge the impact that this trade agreement not only had on the economy but also on polarization in America.

### Conclusion

In conclusion, the results of my research have proven my hypothesis incorrect. While researchers have recognized that the economy can have an effect on polarization, I have come to demonstrate that this effect is a two-way street. Where my hypothesis went wrong is the direction that the effect would drive. Rather than the negative effect I predicted, the effect of polarization on the economy appears to be beneficial, working to help the economy prosper. I had to take into account a few control variables that turned out to be key factors of evidence for the research. The polarization of the members of Congress became the biggest piece of evidence to show why the effects are happening. This means that polarization is not some completely negative phenomena; polarization may have positive consequences to go along with all the negative annotations that already clouds its perception. There is no denying that polarization has an effect on the economy, further research should be put into discovering how and why these effects work in a constructive manner for the economy.

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# TURKISH AND JORDANIAN TREATMENT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES

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Images of the Syrian refugee crisis have only recently begun washing onto the pages of Facebook and social media. The bloody, and brutal Syrian civil war that erupted in the wake of the Arab Spring and the refugee crisis it unleashed has global ramifications that will be felt for generations. The endless torrent of violence has displaced millions from their homes, ripped families apart, and left a burgeoning legacy of orphans and widows to seek sanctuary in increasingly unwelcoming host countries.

The Syrian civil war and the resulting refugee crisis did not happen overnight. The modern Middle Eastern region emerged from decisions made by the Allies during and after the First World War. Relatively quiet provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, were

eviscerated when France and Great Britain arbitrarily carved the landscape into some of the least stable and internationally explosive states in the world. These First World War agreements have had lasting and devastating consequence that are at the very heart of the current conflicts and politics in the region today (Galen 2013).

The defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, under which most Arab countries had lived for centuries also served as a shield against European rule. After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, new national identities and social classes arose to challenge, and even replace, the former identities of clan, tribe, and religion. France continued to follow a policy of divide and rule, splitting the territory along regional and ethnic lines in the remaining parts of

Syria. Syrian minorities were widely dispersed and did not have a geographical base to give rise to political unity, resulting in warring social identities that continue to have a damaging impact on Syrian political life (Fildis 2011).

At the end of the first decade of the new millennium, numerous Arab regimes throughout the region saw their absolute domination evaporate with the Arab uprisings. The more power these regimes lost, the more repressive they became and began to view civil society as insubordinate and corrupt. Public expression became treasonable and the media was silenced. Protest movements in Syria began with small, limited gatherings early in 2011 as fear began to permeate through society. The tipping point, however, was children being arrested and tortured in Daara for writing anti-government statements on the walls of their school. Underground protests suddenly became massive movements. The regime's response was quick and violent. The resulting civil war has shown un-paralleled acts of violence and human rights violations from a ruling power onto its people (Kawakibi 2013).

The magnitude of the crisis is numbing, and with the accusations of human rights violations and the wave of refugees that have continued to swell over the neighboring borderlands. The international community has offered little assistance, leaving the gargantuan

task of processing and managing the refugees in the hands of Syria's closest neighbors. The two border countries most affected by the crisis are the Kingdom of Jordan with 632,762 refugees, and the Republic of Turkey with 2,181,293 refugees (UNHCR, 2015). Although both countries share a predominantly Sunni Muslim population, there are fundamental differences that influence their overall approach to the ongoing crisis. This research will undertake a comparative case study examining historical and cultural influences and the treatment of displaced persons, which will determine which country has been able to manage the current crisis more effectively.

A global standard of successful refugee management is measured by a state's adherence to the rules and regulations outlined in the Geneva Hague conventions. When determining overall successful management, it is also imperative to consider the history that forged a host country's regime and national identity. My hypothesis is that Turkey is more successful in managing the Syrian refugee crisis due to a historical desire to be identified as European. This has manifested in modern times through continued efforts to become a member of the European Union (EU).

Syria is located in the Middle East and is bordered by Iraq to the east, the Mediterranean Sea and Lebanon to

the west, Israel to the southwest, Turkey to the north, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the South. Turkey is strategically located at the crux of Southeastern Europe and Southwest Asia, controlling the Turkish straits linking the Black and Aegean Seas. In addition to the borders it shares with Syria and the Black Sea and Aegean Seas, Bulgaria and Greece are to the west (CIA, 2015).

Before the civil war started in 2011, 74% of Syrians identified as Sunni, 13% as Shia with about 10% being Kurdish or other. The majority of Jordan's roughly 8 million people identify as ethnically Arab with a majority of Sunni Muslims. Arabic is the primary language for both Jordanians and Syrians. In contrast, a majority of Turkey's roughly 80 million people identify as Turkish with a small Kurdish population. While the official religion is Muslim, with a Sunni majority, the official language is Turkish as opposed to other Arab countries in the region (CIA 2015).

### JORDAN

A fragmented scrap of no man's land of the former Ottoman Empire, the lands of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan are steeped in a rich history. Nowar (2006) states, "Trans-Jordan became part of the Hashemite King Faisal al Hussain's Kingdom of Syria, which was later destroyed by the French Empire in 1920".

Under the British Mandate in the years following WWI, it developed into an independent state. Although it was never directly occupied by Britain, Nowar explains, "attempts to rule it indirectly through local government administration failed miserably. Lacking not only to consent and free will of the Arab people, it also was deficient in any form of political organization, central authority, and coercive power vital for its cohesion. Before the occupation of Trans-Jordan by Amir Abdullah al-Hussein in March 1921, disorder, crime and chaos prevailed."

Abdullah desired to bring the Bedouin tribes of the area together and focused his efforts on this in the period between the two World Wars. He believed in the necessity of Arab rule "in the face of increasing Western encroachment" (Nowar 2006). Trans-Jordan almost achieved full independence through a series of treaties between 1928 and 1946. "Britain retained a degree of control over foreign affairs, armed forces, communications and state finances, Emir Abdullah commanded the administrative and military machinery of the regular government. On March 22, 1946, Abdullah negotiated a new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty, ending the British mandate and gaining full independence for Transjordan" (Nowar 2006). The official name became The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1949, ruled by King Abdullah, who was assassinated by a Palestinian radical in

1951. Abdullah's son Hussein succeeded to the throne. (Library of Congress 2006).

Jordan, like most Middle Eastern states that were born from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, is fairly new to the International realm. Soon after its liberation from British control, the kingdom became the first host of Palestinian refugees who have arrived in waves since the creation of Israel and have become a permanent part of the Jordanian population. Unresolved aspects of the Palestinian state have led to its status as a haven for refugees, but also have dual effects on the kingdom's regime. While on one hand, it poses challenges to sovereignty, it is an asset to economic development with refugees creating a pool of cheap labor, in addition to the substantial international assistance Jordan receives for refugee resettlement and integration (Chatelard 2010).

Jordan has more Palestinian refugees that anywhere else in the world. After the Arab-Israeli war, Jordan's population increased from 500,000 to 1.5 million, one-third of them being refugees. The second Arab-Israeli war saw another wave of Palestinian refugees cross into Jordan's borders. In addition, tens of thousands of Palestinians have voluntarily settled in the East Bank, placing roughly half of the Jordanian population as originating from Palestine (Chatelard, 2010).

Jordan has hosted other forced

migrants from neighboring Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon, who used Jordan as a transit to resettlement in the United States in the 1970s, as well as Iraqis in the early 1990s who sought asylum in Europe. This resulted in Jordan having the highest ratio of indigenous people to refugees in the world. Since Palestinians are not within the realm of UNHCR, they are rarely included into worldwide statistics. The lack of recognition also stems from the fact that a large number of Palestinians are citizens, with the exception being the refugees from the Gaza Strip that arrived in 1967 (Chatelard 2010).

Domestic politics created a limited trend of refugees to Europe and other Arab countries; as Chatelard illustrates "members of illegal political movements that wanted to avoid imprisonment, such as the Communists in the 1950s and 1960s; members of antimonarchical Islamic parties; and guerrillas of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) who were forcefully expelled after September 1970" (2010). The PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) denoted Jordan as their political and military base in its battle against Israel. This activity posed a direct threat to the ruling Jordanian monarchy and rising tensions escalated into fighting between PLO guerrillas and the regular army. The result was the expulsion of several thousand paramilitary forces and their families, many of whom resettled in Lebanon and reconstituted the organization of their

military (Chatelard, 2010).

The Kingdom of Jordan has been historically generous to refugee populations, in particular refugees from Palestine and Iraq. Until 2013, Jordan maintained an open border policy that was consistent with the Levant agreement with Syria, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, which exempts Syrians from visa requirements. The traditionally welcoming attitude of Jordanians has been eroded by financial problems, political tensions, and the excessive strain that has been placed on its infrastructure. The majority of Syrians seeking asylum in the kingdom were families and they were finding housing in urban areas as almost 80% of them live outside of the camps. These refugees have been entering through the Syrian border in the north where the camps are located. A limited amount of space in the camps and the likelihood that the refugees have extended families living in the kingdom have driven them to choose urban areas over the camps. Camps also have a poor reputation for safety and sanitation and pale in comparison to Turkish camps which have been regarded as the highest standard (Akram, et al 2013).

Jordan is not a signatory to the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and the Jordanian Constitution prohibits extradition of political refugees. The law under Residence and Foreigners' Affairs requires that those entering the country

as political asylum seekers present themselves to a police station within 48 hours of their arrival, and grants the authority to recommend to the Minister of the Interior on a case-by-case basis whether persons that entered illegally should be deported. Refugees are not automatically granted rights and must apply for a one year residency permit, which are granted in exceedingly small numbers. A list of jobs only Jordanian nationals are allowed to have is published by the Ministry of Labor (Sadek 2013).

A 1998 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Kingdom of Jordan and the UNHCR imposes a time restriction of six months for refugees, after which the UNHCR must find a suitable third country for resettlement. The majority of Arab countries have not ratified the Geneva Convention or its Protocol and therefore are not legally responsible to afford protection or aid to asylum seekers. Initially, Palestinian refugees from Syria were separated at the border and referred to the UNRWA. In 2013, however, the Jordanian government issued a policy refusing the admittance of Palestinian refugees (Sadek 2013; Akram, et al 2013).

The Kingdom of Jordan signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR in 1998 that allows the UNHCR to determine refugee status and process those refugees out of Jordan. In it, the Jordanian government agrees to

respect the non-discrimination and non-refoulement obligations outlined in the Geneva Convention. The MoU requires the UNHCR to find solutions for refugees within six months and establishes refugees temporary residence (Akram, et al 2013).

Although Jordan is not bound by the Geneva Convention or its Protocol, they are subject to several other treaties spanning human rights issues in the same spirit as the Convention. Jordan has international obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which are intended to ensure equality and freedom from discrimination. Obligations under the Convention Against Torture prevent refoulement and the Arab Charter on Human Rights lay out many of the same principles of treatment and protection as the Geneva Convention (Akram et al 2013).

The Kingdom of Jordan's laws apply to those considered foreigners but makes no mention of refugees. The laws stipulate that the Minister of Internal Affairs regulates the documents required for entry and stay and determines the conditions all foreigners attempting entry into the country. They also state that any non-citizen of the kingdom (to include refugees) can be expelled at the discretion of the Minister. Even though they approached

the initial refugee crisis with an open-door policy (no visa) towards Syria, due to the sheer volume of refugees crossing the border, the Jordanian government was forced to restrict the rate of entry. The large number of asylum seekers has pushed the limits of the already resource poor Jordanian infrastructure beyond its limits (Akram, et al 2013).

In practice, the kingdom is supposed to prioritize refugees at the border giving precedence to children, the elderly, and sick. In June of 2013, a Human Right Watch report asserted that the Jordanians were intentionally closing borders at more populated areas, forcing the already exhausted refugees to travel further to the northeastern border. In July of 2014, the agency updated the situation, reporting that there were thousands of Syrians living in unregulated camps in the demilitarized zone and they had been there for months awaiting entry (Akram, et al 2013; Houry 2015).

As Houry argues, "Jordan is blocking thousands of Syrian asylum seekers at its northeastern border region in deplorable conditions. Satellite images taken on December 5, 2015, confirm that thousands of people are stuck in remote desert areas just inside Jordan's border with Syria" (2015). His report continues with declarations from the UNHRC asserting that the Jordanian government is putting the lives of the refugees at risk,



most of whom are women and children urgently in need of food and water (Houry 2015).

The Kingdom of Jordan has also been accused by various NGOs of illegally deporting Syrians, breaking the concept of non-refoulement. Reports from the UNHCR indicate that while some of these deportations are warranted, many are not. While the Jordanian government has retained the absolute right to deport or reject foreigners, the UNHCR has reported Jordan's refoulement to the Human Rights Council. The Jordanian government often uses the claim of national security, even in cases where it is clear that there are no specific actions Syrian refugees took to warrant deportation. Although the kingdom of Jordan is technically within their rights to protect their national security and deport foreigners as prescribed in their local laws and the MoU with the UNHCR, Syrians that have been deported are afforded the option of re-entry, which is not afforded to other refugee populations such as Iraqis who cannot re-enter for five years and Palestinians who can never return.

The MoU with the UNHCR provides provisions allowing asylum seekers the ability to seek employment in an effort to support themselves and stipulates the Ministry of Labor as the agency designated to grant work permits. However, the Jordanian government has severely limited the

occupations available to refugees and the work permits are rarely issued. As a result, many Syrian refugees put themselves at risk of deportation or detention by working illegally. The housing competition has increased along with the cost of rent. Child labor has become a problem and many NGOs in the region have initiated campaigns directed at increasing attendance in schools, which run on two shifts to accommodate the growing population (Akram, et al 2013).

The Syrian refugees living in camps are restricted to the campsite unless they obtain the sponsorship of a Jordanian family willing to take responsibility for them. The resettlement process is stagnant and lacks the support necessary to facilitate the process. It is not surprising then that a significant number of refugees are opting to return to Syria in the face of the rising conflict. Many have cited the intolerable conditions in Jordan or the need to find work to support their families. In light of the extreme risk to returning Syrians, the NGOs working in the area, do not consider this a viable solution. Cuts to aid budgets have added to the unbearable conditions, with the majority of refugees outside the camps affected the most. In comparison, the UNHCR said the superior living conditions in Turkey are the main contributing factor to refugees not returning to Syria, as opposed to those in Lebanon and Jordan where the already poor conditions continue to

deteriorate (Akram 2013; Associated Press 2015). Geography may play a part for those looking to escape the Middle East altogether, as Turkey is considered the bridge to the West.

Registered refugees are entitled to individual services similar to those of the UNHCR. Assad's declaration that Palestinians leaving Syria will not be allowed re-entry guides the UNRWA's practice of only recording, not registering, Palestinians from Syria, allowing them to preserve their Syrian status. Jordan's policy of non-admission, and the deportation of Palestinians, has further obstructed the capacity for UNRWA to assist Palestinians. Deportation is quick and leaves little time for NGO investigation or legal assistance. Solutions are further limited, as UNRWA fears negotiation of resettlement would interfere with their ability to return (Akram, et al 2013).

Other asylum seeking individuals contribute to the total refugee population in Jordan, adding to the excessive strain on the kingdom's resources. Iraqi refugees lack legal status in Jordan and are also unable to work. Jordan's strict stance against integration of refugees contributes to the difficult process of third country resettlement. Overcrowding is the major issue faced by Sudanese and Somali refugees, who receive similar treatment to Iraqis, and many had their financial aid withdrawn since the Syrian crisis began (Akram, et al 2013).

### **TURKEY**

In the wake of WWI and the Allied dissection of the Middle East, the Turkish War of Independence gave birth to the modern Republic of Turkey in 1923. This new republican regime led by Ataturk (or Father of the Turks), was envisioned as a secular, pro-Western nation state, rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

This new Kemalist Revolution, and the principles Ataturk established became the heart and soul of the newly emerging state. Kemalist ideology, and the movement for Western identity became the most salient influences in the formation of the country's identity. The Kemalist movement openly challenged the benefit of religion. They determined that "religion was not compatible with modern science and secularism was imperative for modernity" (Muslim Nation 2006).

The passing of the Turkish Constitution in 1921 by the newly formed Turkish Grand National Assembly, the unicameral legislative body of the emerging Republic, laid the foundation for Ataturk's regime to establish the legitimacy of core Kemalist beliefs with radical reforms designed to modernize the new Republic. In 1922, the newly formed Turkish Grand National Assembly wasted no time in eradicating the constitutional monarchy. Then, in an unprecedented move, they replaced the Islamic Sharia law structure, modeling

European legal codes and building on laws it had passed during the War of Independence. In 1924, a new constitution was passed. And while it declared Islam as the official religion of the new Republic, it eradicated the Caliphate and transferred those powers to the National Assembly.

A series of radical political, legal, cultural and economic policy reforms, often referred to as "Ataturk's Reforms", were intended to erase the dominance of religion and tradition from the Ottoman Empire, quickly followed and transformed almost every aspect of Turkish life (Houston 2006). To the Kemalists, Western ideals offered means of social, political, and economic development. Latin script replaced Arabic and the Gregorian calendar was substituted for the Islamic calendar. To strict Muslims, the radical reforms posed by Anaturk and his regime, sowed the seeds for dissent and mistrust.

The Ottoman Empire and Turkey share a long tradition of refugee and immigrant acceptance. During their reign, the Ottomans received many Muslim, Jewish, and Christian refugees and many were resettled as immigrants. The thought at the time was the number of people was a reflection of the influence and power of the regime so long as they accepted the sovereign and declared fidelity. The culture of the Ottoman Empire was ethically and culturally diverse and this led to the integration of many non-Muslim ethnic

groups. In contrast stands the very different immigration and refugee policy of the Turkish Republic. While it remains silent in regard to religion, ethnic affiliation and acceptance of the Turkish language are present in its immigration policies (Kırisci 2000).

Turkey's first modern experience with a mass migration took place in 1922. In the period following WWI, Muslims from Greece were forced to move into Turkey and Orthodox Christians were forced into Greece. Turkey continued to receive an influx of displaced peoples mostly from Balkan countries and former Ottoman territories until the end of World War II (Mellon 2006). World War II turned Turkey into a temporary country of asylum for many people fleeing the Nazis. Thousands of European Jews sought refuge in Turkish borders, ultimately being resettled in Palestine and then Israel. While Muslims and ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, Greeks from the Aegean, and Italians from the Dodecanese Islands also sought asylum inside Turkish borders, most returned to their homes after the war (Mellon 2006).

The post-World War II era brought two more decades of more refugees to Turkey's door, with Balkan refugees fleeing Yugoslavia from the 1950s well into the 1970s. In 1951, Turkey became a signatory of the Geneva Convention. The Protocol abolished geographical restrictions as European countries, meaning that they

exclude non-European individuals from recognition as refugees. However, Turkey accepted the convention with a geographical limitation, meaning it would apply the convention only to those seeking asylum as a result of events in Europe.

The failure of Turkey to adopt the no geographic restriction policy of the Protocol and maintain its interpretation of the original ratification had little effect during the Cold War era. As a result, Turkey assumed legal obligation only for those people seeking asylum because of the so-called communist threat in Europe. In essence, Turkey was a buffer state and the refugee flow from the Eastern bloc was very limited (Icduygu and Keyman 2000).

The Cold War saw thousands of asylum seekers flee to Turkey from Communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, Bulgarian Turks fled to Turkey as a result of changes in policies by the Bulgarian government. The Turkish government set up reception camps for Bulgarian Turks, however, they were free to travel, settle, and work were they pleased; they were eventually absorbed into the population as citizens. The Turkish government mobilized an enormous amount of humanitarian assistance with legal provisions assisting them in importing their cars, exchanging their money, and an accelerated path to Turkish citizenship. There were also

government sponsored job assistance and housing projects (Mellon 2006; Kırisci 2000).

It is only recently that Turkey has transformed into a transit country due mostly to the deterioration of conditions in the Middle East and east African countries. Turkey has experienced three significant flows of refugees from Iraq. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw almost half a million Kurds seeking refuge in Turkey as a result of the war between Iraq and Iran. The initial reaction of the Defense Minister was to deny them entry but within days he announced the humanitarian situation was too great and opened the borders. Kırisci explains "there was a concern that if the term 'refugee' was used this could entail obligations for Turkey under the 1951 Convention. Instead terms such as 'peshmergas' and 'temporary guests' were employed, and these asylum seekers were housed in three separate camps. Turkey bitterly complained about a lack of international burden sharing, while human rights groups criticized Turkey for failing to recognize them as refugees and providing complete protection under the 1951 Convention" (2000).

The Gulf War in the early 1990s saw not only Iraqi refugees, but many contractors from various countries that had been working in Kuwait. The Kurdish population met with the full force of the Iraqi army and fled to

Turkish borders. Ankara grew concerned with the number of Kurds they felt were being forced in their direction. The Turkish government deemed the situation a national security threat, closed the Iraqi border, and threatened military action if the UN would not intervene. This prompted U.S. intervention and the implementation of safe zones which included U.S. military airdrops to the refugees accompanied by the threat of American military action if Iraq violated the safe zones or disturbed the returning population. The repatriation of Kurds to northern Iraq was completed in record time (Mellon 2006; Kırisci, 2000).

The new millennium introduced the third wave as the war in Iraq ravaged the nation for almost a decade which has now been combined with the Syrian crisis, although Iraqi refugees are treated under a different classification (Mellon 2006; Kırisci 2000). Historically, Turkey did not identify itself as a country of immigration and therefore saw no reason to construct effective policies on migration. The logic of the Cold War era combined with the 1951 Geneva Convention dictated Turkish migration policy. It is important to note that the possibility of becoming a transit country of migration for non-European asylum seekers was not considered a serious possibility. The changes in the geopolitical environment saw Turkey's geographic location as the ideal transit zone and officially transformed Turkey

into a country of first asylum (Icduygu and Keyman 2000).

As the Syrian civil war escalated, the Turkish government with its increased sense of regional responsibility as the ambassador of democracy, repeatedly tried to convince the Syrian president to adopt crisis containing reforms. When those efforts failed, a clear stance against Assad's regime emerged from Ankara calling for international isolation of Syria and the welcoming of humanitarian aid towards displaced civilians. Initially, Turkey did not expect the war to last long. The Turkish government rejected international assistance, resolving to handle the situation independently. However, Ankara's tune soon changed, as asylum seekers continued to pour over the borders. In 2012, Turkey turned to the international community in an appeal to share the ever increasing burden (Ahmadown 2014).

In contrast to previous situations with non-European asylum seekers, this was the first time Turkey followed an unconditional open door policy. This policy was shaped in part to the Levant Quartet's policies of no visa requirements and free trade that Turkey had established with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan in 2010. However, Turkey maintained its Geneva Convention geographic restrictions, referring to the fleeing Syrians as guests and made concessions to give the fleeing Syrians unrestricted access at designated points

along the border. In October of 2011, the Turkish government afforded the Syrians temporary protection, ensuring a policy towards non-refoulment that placed no time restriction on length of stay. For refugees staying in camps, this translated into free health care, education (in Arabic and Turkish), and employment in specific circumstances (Ahmadowd 2014; Akram et al 2013).

The refugee population is dispersed through Turkey as the 22 refugee camps are unable to hold the close to 2 million civilians fleeing the war. Turkey has been applauded for the container camps it has pioneered which are considered the best to date. There are some Syrians living with host families in the cities; others live in urban areas around the country, the most vulnerable of which are living in collective shelters in mosques and other structures (Akram et al 2013). The government of Turkey has taken on a majority of the responsibility in managing the costs and associated services required to care for the refugees. Although the Turkish government has been extremely generous in its response, its assistance and protection are not evenly distributed throughout the refugee population. Turkey has also proved unwilling to share information regarding its actions, and has denied access to refugees to NGOs and INGOs thus marginalizing other traditional relief actors. The Prime Minister shares authority over the refugee situation

with the Ministry of the Interior (Mol). In the past, asylum seeking guests were handled at the provincial level, resulting in irregular and inconsistent practices. The local police were traditionally responsible for registering refugees, and fall under the Mol's governing authority. Another key government agency is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for all foreign policy aspects, such as assisting with family reunification for refugees (Akram et al 2013).

The Turkish government has made substantial progress toward centralizing the management of refugees and addressing the issues with having such matters previously covered by administrative circulars in secondary Turkish legislation, as well as provisions that no longer rely on local police. Turkey created their first domestic law on asylum, called the Foreigners and International Protections Law. It stipulates that "foreigners and other individuals with international protection, will not be sent back to places where they will be tortured, suffer inhumane treatment or punishment that is humiliating, or be threatened due to race, religion, or group membership; as well as setting up an agency in the Turkish Ministry of Justice on international protection to implement related regulations. Another stipulation is that foreigners remaining in the country for more than 90 days must apply for residence permits and limits the length of time a person can be

banned from entering the country to five years; unless the person is considered a serious threat to order and security, in which case the ban can be ten years” (Soykan 2012). The EU Commission also issued a statement praising both the adoption of the law and the efforts Turkey has already put forth on behalf of refugees (Akram et al 2013).

The new Ministry department created as a result of this new policy is the Directorate General on Migration Administration (DGMA). The sole responsibility of policies relating to refugee registration, to include classifying the recipients of temporary protection and foreigners, and international protection are now the DGMA's. They are also responsible for all refugees living outside camps. The responsibility for actually implementing the temporary protection, still falls under the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Agency (AFAD). This agency was created in 2009 by consolidating three different agencies and is responsible for the building of camps (Akram et al 2013).

Another significant influential issue affecting Turkish policy towards Syrians and migration policy in general has been the creation and expansion of the Islamic State (IS). Beginning in 2014, IS's expansion throughout Iraq and Syria has had a tremendous impact on the humanitarian crisis and has been instrumental in pushing the number of

asylum seekers crossing Turkish borders past the 2 million mark. The rapid surge in asylum seekers revealed the deficiencies in current Turkish migration policies. Beginning in 2015, the Turkish government initiated limits to its open door policy, admitting refugees based on availability of camp space. Turkish strategy has also included encouraging Syrians to stay in their country by minimizing the threat and extending support to NGOs operating inside Syria (Jarosiewicz and Strachota 2015).

Under the 1994 Council of Ministers Regulation, UNHCR conducts resettlement for the populations recognized by the Turkish government as refugees. This stipulation is due to the geographic restrictions Turkey still maintains from the 1951 Convention. One of the major differences between Turkey and other regional host countries is the fact that UNHCR does not work directly with the refugee population but rather has to provide services through the government of Turkey. Voluntary repatriation procedures are conducted through the UNHCR as well as basic needs for the camp population of refugees. There are no MoUs that exist between the Turkish government and NGOs operating in the country and they lack clear guidance as to the activities they are allowed to engage in (Akram et al 2013).

As Icduygu et al (2013) express, there is a need to clarify the protection standards. In addition, the steps Turkey

has taken in terms of outlining the rights and obligations of persons receiving temporary protection are very few and this is paving the way for uncertainty on the side of Syrian refugees. Bidingger (2015) states, "uniform, concrete policies regarding Syrians in Turkey remain elusive." However, as the costs of looking after refugees rose and tensions between them and the local population grew, deterioration of security situations on the border mixed with the rising tension between the Alawites (a Muslim faction) and the Sunnis that lived throughout the region. A report from Human Rights Watch details sporadic border closures in 2014. The Turkish government introduced new standards requiring Syrians to present travel documents upon entry. Simpson (2015) also asserts that "Turkey has all but closed its borders to Syrian asylum seekers and is summarily pushing back Syrians detected as they try to cross. Syrians described Turkish border guards intercepting them at or near the border, in some cases beating them, and pushing them and dozens of others back into Syria or detaining and then summarily expelling them along with hundreds of others."

International guidance provided by the UN concludes that the entire country has been engulfed in violence and urge all countries to provide asylum to Syrians seeking refuge. Syrian refugees have left Turkey in record numbers this past year

prompting the EU to propose negotiations with Turkey aimed at reducing the flow of irregular migrants into Europe. These deliberations also include a \$3 billion aid package as well as visa liberalization for Turkish nationals, prompting criticism that Europe was trying to buy Turkey's cooperation in keeping Syrians off their doorstep (Simpson 2015).

Although grateful to their Turkish neighbors, Syrian refugees are discontent about their status in the country. They "remained unsure of what they could expect in terms of support from the Turkish authorities and how long they would be welcome" (Amnesty International 2014). As Oner and Genc (2015) explain, "They have been able to escape from the war, but many of them are now in limbo in Turkey. Thus, many Syrians do exactly the same what their predecessors – all other non-Turkish asylum-seekers coming from a non-European country, primarily Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans – have done in the past. They leave. It is not because of the temporary protection regime. It is because of the main understanding which lies beneath the migration and asylum regime and its management."

### Conclusion

Since its birth in the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has always shown a desire to identify as a part of the European West's civilized concept. This continued goal is reflected in the recently adopted political and economic



reforms and accession talks in 2005 with the EU. The substantial strides Turkey has taken towards becoming a fully functioning democracy stem directly from this decades old desire for European recognition (Szigetvari 2014; McLaren and Cop 2011).

The Kurdish situation was a major deterrent to EU accessions characterized by the long war in the southeastern part of the country in the 1980s and 1990s. The perception that the country was under significant threat from a political movement of Kurdish origin, turned into violations of freedom of speech and other human rights violations. As those relations have seen a dramatic decrease in violence, added to the new influx of asylum seekers, it appears Turkey's treatment of Syrian refugees is an effort to avoid making the same mistake with European powers again (McLaren and Cop 2011).

Turkey also instituted a "zero problems" policy towards neighboring countries in an effort to meet EU requirements. It has repaired its reputation among Arab nations who once viewed it as a traitor. Now hailed as a model for Muslim countries and democracy, Turkey has taken a much more assertive role in the region. Things were going well until the Syrian civil war, in which Turkey took a strong stance against the Assad regime, identifying itself as a defender of democracy. Turkey has used its unique position as a bridge between the East

and West to assume a role of natural mediator (Szigetvari 2014). All of these efforts, especially the extremely self-funded treatment and care of refugees, is a strategic attempt to erase the memories of past violations from the European memory, in direct efforts to become a recognized member of Europe.

In Jordan, with King Abdullah's succession to the throne in 1999, came promises of major social, economic, and political reforms aimed at a more democratic society. Those results have been modest and with the continued influence on government decision making, the security services have drawn strong criticism. The inequality gap between the rich and poor has been exacerbated by liberalization efforts. Jordan has no potential to partner with the EU and the only motivation to improve its treatment of refugees has stemmed from Western economic aid (Saamen 2012).

Jordanian strategy has always been aimed at preserving the monarchy and its national image, geared towards the shaping of a Middle Eastern power balance. The old dream of Hashemite rule over the region has been replaced with the acceptance of significant weakness in the structure of the kingdom. This has redirected Jordanian efforts away from regional hegemony and towards peacekeeping efforts with neighboring countries (Saamen 2012).

Jordan's self-preservation

policy resulted in closed borders and refouled Syrian and Palestinian refugees in the thousands. Even as a small monarchy with limited resources and an increasing reliance on outside powers, especially Western states, Jordan has maintained its sovereignty, and has not adopted new policies to provide better care to the asylum seeking populations its hosts. While Turkey still has room for improvement, the major policy changes that have affected the refugees the most clearly stem from the over-arching appeal the Turkish government is directing at the European Union.

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# FROM OVERMAN TO PALMER: THE INCLUSION OF ANARCHISTS IN THE FIRST RED SCARE

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Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were arrested in 1917 on charges related to the Sedition Acts of World War I. This point marked the beginning of the anarchist and communist scares, two years before the actually Red Scare of 1919. Judiciary committees were formed to investigate memberships and comrades of anarchist groups. Goldman and Berkman, two such anarchists, were linked with the biggest enemies of the United States in the inter-war period but have been outshone by even bigger devils since the Second World War, Bolshevik communists. Historians have since lost the scent of these influencers and they have disappeared into the archives, masked by the Bolsheviks. The documents produced by anarchists that were active between 1919 and 1920, including Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, along with the fears expressed in committees in the Senate and House of Representatives, specifically the Overman Committee on Bolshevik

Propaganda and the Review of the Palmer Raids, show that the First Red Scare was not 'Red' at all, but rather 'Red and Black.' The influencers of the interwar period were not Bolshevik at all, as was feared in the federal government during the First Red Scare, but were anarchist-communists in the vein of Pyotr Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin.

Historians have largely ignored the connection between the anarchists and the communists in the United States during the 1910s. While the two groups did not work together on most issues, they did have common goals. Both groups were opposed to entering World War I, conscription, business, capitalism, and the United States government. The last issue is what drew the attention of Congress and the Attorney General of the United States. While historians have looked at both groups separately, they have not made the connection between the two groups. These groups were not operating separately but were in the

same sphere speaking to the same anti-government peoples. Much of the history of the first Red Scare was written during the second Red Scare and the Cold War. This may have had an influence on the way the groups were described and how the anarchist groups were treated as entities. Senator Joseph McCarthy, during the second Red Scare, also influenced the way historians described the outlying anti-government groups. They weakened the position of the communists and anarchists and were dismissive of the fear that the government had for them. Renshaw hastily concludes that the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) was "never a serious revolutionary threat" but merely a "militant labour union."<sup>1</sup> This historian, like many others, does not make the connection between the labor unions like the IWW and the anarchist leaders that were operating in the same time and space.

Political scientists also wrote histories of the era, trying to find motivation in the groups and the reason for the responses of the general public. Stanley Coben believes that "millions of Americans are both extraordinarily fearful of social change and prejudiced against those minority groups which they perceive as 'threatening intruders.'"<sup>2</sup> He does, however, only focus on the fear of communism after WWI and the Bolshevik Revolution while dismissing the role of the anarchists. This could also be part of the "second Red Scare effect," though it does discount a large group of "intruders" as the author described.

There has lately been resurgence in the study of the first Red Scare since the fall of the Berlin Wall, starting in the mid-1990s. They have focused on both the anarchists and the

communists, unlike the historians of the Cold War, yet have still categorized them into separate spheres. The histories of the anarchist movement focus on the key figures and famous court cases. Sacco and Vanzetti and Emma Goldman have all seen a renewed focus on their lives and their influence on the anti-government movement. Italian historian Philip Cannistraro, connects both the Italian and American anarchist movements by stating that "as Malatesta pushed for a united revolutionary front with socialists and republicans, Mussolini became convinced of the growing political importance of anarchism."<sup>3</sup> He still does not make the connection between the Bolsheviks and other communists and the anarchists.

Oz Frankel describes Emma Goldman as "a fighter for free speech, a communitarian, a libertarian, an anticommunist, an extreme individualist, a precursor of modern feminism, a true subversive, a harmless visionary expelled for voicing innocent ideas, a suffering victim, a cheerful, life-affirming woman, or an amusing, sharp-tongued Jewish grandmother."<sup>4</sup> This historian, like many others, dismisses the connection between the two subversive groups, going so far as to label the subject anticommunist. Her role, while expanded in the latest histories, has been minimized to that of anarchist only while completely disregarding the connections to the communist groups and the IWW.

Much can be seen in the government documents which have not been examined closely by historians. If the government, especially Congress and the Department of Justice, made a connection between the two groups, there should be something that linked

all the players that has not been examined yet. Communists and anarchists acted in the same spheres and spoke to the same people. They attended the same meetings and were caught with the same readings. They ran similar pamphlet shops and newspapers. Their rhetoric was the same and their goals were the same, though the two groups had different routes to the solution. They wrote letters to one another and conspired together to arrange strikes and sit-ins and oppose the draft. The government made this connection and yet historians have not.

Emma Goldman was a prominent figure in far-left radical circles. She, along with Alexander Berkman, wrote a newspaper and made speeches across the United States from the late 1800s to the time of their deportation in 1920. During their deportation trial, at which Goldman represented herself, she believed that it was her "mission in life to ascertain the cause of our social evils and of our social difficulties" and it is her "aim to diagnose a wrong."<sup>5</sup> This is the same rhetoric used by the founder of anarchist-communist thought, Prince Pyotr Kropotkin. Goldman further invokes her alliance with other far-left groups in the trial when she says that "no new faith- not even the most humane and peaceable- has ever been considered 'within the law' by those who were in power."<sup>6</sup> Emma Goldman counted among her followers and students during her trial period Eugene Debs and John Reed, both prominent members of the IWW and Bolshevik movement in the United States.

During the trial of Goldman and Berkman, the prosecution made the connection between all subversive

groups acting during the time. The prosecutor compared their case to that of John Reed, who was a supporter of the Bolsheviks.<sup>7</sup> This is one of the earliest accounts of the first Red Scare that links the two groups together and this is done in passing at a deportation trial, two years before the actual Red Scare of 1920. The attorney further states that "they are banded together, not to secure the repeal of that law [conscription], not to petition Congress in an orderly fashion, but to set themselves and their cohorts above the law of the United States."<sup>8</sup> This early connection provided evidence for the later congressional hearings on propaganda spread during and after the war but concludes that it was the anarchist wing of the communist parties and not the Bolsheviks. This conclusion would also be used to deport other anarchists and arrest communists and Goldman's records would be used to find other subversives.

Goldman and Bakunin had been arrested in a print shop, armed with pamphlets and a newspaper. Goldman was the editor of *Mother Earth* and Berkman was the editor of *The Blast*, two leftist pamphlets that were found on several communists and anarchists during the later Overman Committee investigations. Content stated that "these two anarchists are the leading spirits in this country in a countrywide conspiracy to spread anti-registration propaganda."<sup>9</sup> Goldman and Berkman had admitted to attending socialist and anarchist meetings and speaking to those in favor of birth control. However, Berkman tried to distance the pair from the larger communist movement by affirming that "we admit that we are opposed to militarism and to conscription. We have been carrying on

an anti-militarist propaganda for twenty-five or thirty years. But we did not conspire and we did not advise people not to register [for the draft]."<sup>10</sup> The major fear of the United States government during WWI was that people would avoid the draft and that these "communists," as the government describes them, were trying to convince people to not register. Congress feared this because they thought that the Bolsheviks were trying to convince Americans to abstain from the war effort.

The trial of Goldman and Berkman started the first witch hunts of the first Red Scare, two years before the start of the Red Summer of 1919, which was the height of the first anti-leftist push in the United States. In 1919, the rhetoric of the communists started to accelerate and Goldman and Berkman were writing letters and pamphlets to other subversive groups during the fall trying to garner more support for their cause. John Reed, who had by then written his first-hand description of the Bolshevik Revolution titled *Ten Days That Shook the World*, wrote to CE Ruthenberg, the founder of the Communist Party of the United States, that a vote for Mensheviks would "mean the continuation on a national scale of the bitter feud which has rendered the New York Local so ineffectual, and will make the new Party absolutely impotent to accomplish its work."<sup>11</sup> There had, at the time, been in-fighting within the various national leftist groups, but the leaders of the various factions were trying to regain support from all leftist groups, including the anarchists. The anarchist faction of the new Communist Party had the same ability to vote in the establishment of the central committees as the rest of factions.

Reed continued to try to gain support for the new party through August of 1919. He wrote to the Labor Committee of New York that "ever since the minority walked out of the Left Wing Conference, they have entered upon a bitter attack against the Left Wing, have refused to support the organization-issuing their own dues-stamps- and have cancelled 3,000 orders for the Revolutionary Age."<sup>12</sup> The anarchists had, over a period of a few days, refused to participate in the establishment of an official Communist Party and this is where the fractionalization of the two movements began, in 1919 rather than during the period of the trials of Goldman and Berkman. Though the two movements, the communists and the anarchists, had officially split in 1919, their goals according to the United States Congress remained the same.

Another prominent leader at the time, Eugene Debs, wrote for both the communists and the anarchists and tried to keep the two movements from dividing because they would be able to fight better if the two movements were together. Debs urged both groups to consider who the real enemy was and invoked the feelings of revolt in his pamphlets using language like "the faintest whisper of revolt upon the part of their slaves falls like a roar of doom upon their startled ears and strikes terror to their cowardly hearts."<sup>13</sup> Debs tries to remind them that they are fighting for the same goal. He also reminded his fellow communists that anarchists, including Tom Mooney, convicted of participating in the Preparedness Day Bombing in 1916, were victims of "the most infamous conspiracy in American history, and his [Mooney's] conviction was and is a burning disgrace to our courts and a



damning crime against justice.”<sup>14</sup> This reminder serves to show that even on the decline of the anarchist movement on its own and the rise of the communist movement, the two groups supported each other in word and deed.

The most convincing evidence of cohesion between the two groups comes not from the members themselves, but from the government investigations into subversive political groups. One such investigation, dubbed the Overman Committee, spun out of an investigation into German beer manufacturing during WWI. Titled *Bolshevik Propaganda*, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, headed by Senator Overman, spent a month in early 1919 making connections between the leftist groups operating in the United States and their connections with the Bolsheviks in Russia. Their concentration in the subcommittee was on examining the rhetoric in pamphlets of the various groups and making connections both between the groups and with anti-government actions.

One such pamphlet was written by Elizabeth Gurley Flynn on the topic of all groups using sabotage to further the class war. Flynn states that “working-class sabotage is aimed directly at ‘the boss’ and at his profits, in the belief that that is the solar plexus of the employer, that is his heart, his religion, his sentiment, his patriotism.”<sup>15</sup> She was writing for all leftist organizations, including the anarchists, and the Senate Subcommittee did not make the distinction between any of them. The subcommittee placed the anarchists in the same light as the communists when it came to propaganda supporting the Bolshevik Revolution and against the United States Government. A writer from the

IWW, Harrison George, calls all groups to remember that “wherever it is possible for the bourgeoisie to rule to proletariat, it is possible for that proletariat to accomplish its industrial freedom by revolution.”<sup>16</sup> The subcommittees used this as evidence that the groups were not different at all, but were working closely together, though this connection has been long since forgotten.

Finally, the subcommittee had a letter written directly to all American leftist groups from Vladimir Lenin dated to December 1918. In this letter, he calls on “true internationalists, the real representatives of the revolutionary proletariat” to learn “the great truth that all revolutions teach, the truth that has been handed down to us by our best teachers, the founders of modern socialism” and that from them “we have learned that a successful revolution is inconceivable unless it breaks the resistance of the exploiting class.”<sup>17</sup> Lenin goes on to explain that all groups opposed to the bourgeoisie must work together to support the revolution in American and in Russia. Though this does not establish a full connection between the anarchists and the communists, the government believed that it was enough evidence to continue investigating both groups as one. In 1920, the Attorney General of the United States, A. Mitchell Palmer, conducted a raid on several known and suspected communist and anarchist groups across the United States. By this time, the government had established secure connections between the two factions of the leftist movement. They raided print shops, pamphleteers, meeting houses, and individual homes. Because the raids were conducted in a way that the Department of Justice felt were haphazard and over-the-top, the

House of Representatives conducted an investigation into the raids themselves, thus providing evidence presented by Palmer to the committee to the official record. They entered into the record an article by John H. Wigmore, which stated in part:

But the sorry feature is that so many "good people of the village" as Confucius terms them, are led astray to condone with the disciples of violence by favoring this fetish appeal to "freedom of speech." These good people show more touchiness in this tender doctrine than they do to all the claims of all other fundamentals put together. They exalt it above the institutions which constituted their country, and many of them saw it so flaming large that they were ready to let it endanger their country's very existence. They matched the fanatical obsession of John Knox, who once exclaimed, "One mass is more fearful to me than if 10,000 armed enemies were landed in any part of the realm." In their view, one interference of the authorities with freedom to preach resistance to the war was more fearful than news of a German invasion of our National Capital. And one interference in America with the preaching of genuine Bolshevik police assassination would be more shocking than the news of Lenin and Trotsky enthroned in London and Paris.<sup>18</sup>

In his condemnation of the reaction of the government against the subversive groups, the jurist links the two together under Bolshevism. Though it was wrong to assume that Bolshevism was the primary driver of the anarchists, he was correct in that they did work together

against the tyranny of government control.

Palmer responded to the quote by reminding the committee that "there has probably never been in this country a woman who accomplished as much hurt to American morals and citizenship, particularly of the young, as Emma Goldman, so long a consort of the pervert, Alexander Berkman, with whom she was lately deported."<sup>19</sup> This committee was formed to investigate actions taken by Palmer at the height of the first Red Scare, which was supposed to be a response to the Overman Committee's findings of the previous year, yet he invoked the crimes and punishment of the noted anarchists instead of focusing solely on the Bolsheviks. His reaction clearly shows that the government, at least the Attorney General's office, did not distinguish between the red and the black factions of the radical left. For the government, no distinction was needed because these groups were linked. That people now only attribute the actions taken by protesting groups between 1919 and 1920 show that they either do not currently fear the anarchists or that they do not know enough about the anarchist movement of the inter-war period to draw any logical conclusions.

Palmer continued his tirade against the American left in his defense of his actions taken against the various groups in his 1920 raids. He stated that "it was the duty of the Department of Justice, in its assistance of the Bureau of Investigation, to provide for the initial record no more than a *prima facie* case."<sup>20</sup> Palmer's department had all that they believed they needed to connect each leftist group with each other and that the writings presented in the 1919 Bolshevik Propaganda

subcommittee, the pamphlets and letters exchanged between the various factions, the trial of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman, and his knowledge of the Russian and German factions were all that were needed to allow the raids to move forward. The American government was not able to fully define the leftist groups nor were they able to rationally classify them the way that the groups would classify themselves.

Palmer links all of these groups under what he calls a "revolutionary background." He states that this is "the situation of tense and conspiring unrest which has made infinitely more difficult the already hard problem of restoring comfort, tranquility, and tolerable living conditions for the people after the strain and hardship and destruction of an unparalleled war; a war that consumed human lives by the millions and sunk the stored-up savings of the Nations' labor and wealth to an unimaginable degree."<sup>21</sup> Palmer believed that the two groups, the communists and anarchists, were not two separate groups, but one group that stopped progress after the war just as they had tried to stop people from joining the war. He also believed that "most disconcerting of all...is the evident tremendousness, sullenness, determination and power of the class war movement toward enforcement of the aims and theories of social reconstruction on a minority class basis, on a dictatorship of the workers...which they mean to take away from its present ownership without compensation and to manage hereafter, after the Marxian precept, as a common enterprise in the workers' behalf."<sup>22</sup> Again, no distinction is made between the two factions, but they are again linked together through a common goal. Palmer's conclusions on

the groups that led to his raids during the Red Summer were founded in a logical belief; however, these conclusions show a lack of knowledge about leftist movements in the United States and the influence of the Bolsheviks on American activists. His assertion that the Bolsheviks and the anarchists are one body is partially correct, as there were many connections, however he does not give enough credence to the influence of the anarchists on the communists.

One can conclude that the First Red Scare was not, therefore, a Red Scare at all, but was rather a Red and Black Scare with much of the blame or influence falling onto the anarchists that were active in political and activist circles at the time. The pamphlets found during the Palmer Raid were not only written by Lenin, Marx, and Trotsky, but were also written by Goldman, Kropotkin, and Berkman. However the government defined the activist groups, they were correct in fearing that those groups were a threat to the democracy and capitalism in the United States in the inter-war period. These connections between the two groups and their influences on one another need to be further reexamined because many of these groups are still active in the United States, though on a much smaller scale. They have similar goals and want the same outcomes as those anarchists and communists did in the lead up to the Red Summer of 1920.

While this naïveté of historians on the subject of leftist groups can be forgiven because it is a topic that is hard to define if one does not know the inner workings of American leftist groups and their connections with other groups since anarchist movements tend to be secretive about their influences, even

so, the anarchists need to be given their due. They were the binding force during the first Red Scare between the Bolsheviks, Trotskyites, and Kropotkinists and this could have an impact on the way that radical groups are thought of today. There are still connections to be made between anarchists and communists and each of the Red Scares, from 1919 to the 1950s to today, should be reexamined for their connections between the communists and anarchists.

### End Notes

<sup>1</sup>Patrick Renshaw, "The IWW and the Red Scare 1917-24," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no 4 (Oct, 1968): 65.

<sup>2</sup>Stanley Coben, "A Study in Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919-1920," *Political Science Quarterly* 79, no 1 (Mar, 1964): 54.

<sup>3</sup>Philip V Cannistraro, "Mussolini, Sacco-Vanzetti, and the Anarchists: The Transatlantic Context," *The Journal of Modern History* 68, no 1 (Mar, 1996): 38.

<sup>4</sup>Oz Frankel, "Whatever Happened to 'Red Emma'? Emma Goldman, from Alien Rebel to American Icon," *The Journal of American History* 83, no 3 (Dec, 1996): 903.

<sup>5</sup>Emma Goldman, *Address to the Jury*, July 9, 1917, speech.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Harold A Content, *Assistant United States Attorney to the Jury*, July 9, 1917, speech.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Leonard D. Abbot, *The Trial and Conviction of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman*, July 20, 1917, speech.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>John Reed, "Letter of John Reed et al. in New York to CE Ruthenberg in Cleveland," *Comintern Archive* (August 11, 1919).

<sup>12</sup>John Reed, "Letter of John Reed and Ben Gitlow in New York to the Labor Committee of the Left Wing National Conference," *Comintern Archive* (August 13, 1919).

<sup>13</sup>Eugene V. Debs, "The Situation in Ohio," *The Ohio Socialist* (January 8, 1919).

<sup>14</sup>Eugene V. Debs, "Letter to Arthur E. Elmgreen in Chicago," *The Chicago Socialist* (January 11, 1919).

<sup>15</sup>Emily Gurley Flynn, "Extracts from Pamphlet Entitled 'Sabotage,'" in *Bolshevik Propaganda: Hearings Before a Subcommittee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Sixty-Fifth Congress, Third Session and Thereafter, Pursuant to S. Res. 439 and 469, February 11, 1919 to March 10, 1919* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1919); 1037.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, 1048.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, 1071.

<sup>18</sup>Attorney General Mitchell A. Palmer on *Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others, Hearings Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, Sixty-Sixth Congress, Second Session, Part One and Two, June 1, 1920* (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1920): 8.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid, 8.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid, 13.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid, 14.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid, 14.